Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents by Leslie, Christopher R.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 49 | Issue 5 Article 3
Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in
Faithless Agents
Christopher R. Leslie
Copyright c 2008 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1621 (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol49/iss5/3
CARTELS, AGENCY COSTS, AND FINDING VIRTUE IN
FAITHLESS AGENTS
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE*
ABSTRACT
Although price-fixing conspiracies are inherently unstable, many
cartels manage to endure, often for long periods. Many successful
cartels have hierarchical structures made up of high-level executives
(principals) and lower-level managers (agents). For these cartels,
agency cost theory could provide some insights as to how to desta-
bilize them from within. Agency costs exist when a faithless agent
pursues her own interests instead of those of the principal. Although
agency costs are generally considered inefficient, when the principal's
goals are undesirable, the acts of a faithless agent can be beneficial.
Because one traditional approach to reducing agency costs is to align
the interests of the principal and agent, this Article argues that
antitrust policy should maximize agency costs in cartels by decoup-
ling these interests through several interrelated strategies. First,
antitrust law should increase the severity and probability of criminal
punishment of individuals who participate in price fixing. Second,
antitrust law should reward individuals who expose cartel activity
by providing them immunity from all criminal and civil liability
and by paying antitrust bounties to such faithless agents. Finally,
antitrust law should be structured so that employees of a cartel firm
will not trust their employers to protect them should the cartel be
exposed. This Article discusses how antitrust law can perform this
decoupling function while minimizing any negative consequences of
creating distrust within firms.
* Visiting Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Professor of Law and
Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author thanks Larry Cata Backer,
Susan Beth Farmer, Harry First, Mark Lemley, and Tony Reese for suggestions or comments
on earlier versions of this Article. The author also thanks the participants in NYU School of
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INTRODUCTION
Federal antitrust authorities had long suspected that the world's
two leading auction houses-Christie's and Sotheby's-were en-
gaging in illegal collusion, but they lacked proof.' The auction
houses had traditionally made the bulk of their money by charging
a buyers' commission, whereby the successful bidder in each auction
would pay a premium to the auction house above and beyond the
winning bid.2 Historically, each rival competed to lure sellers who
had attractive, high-end items to use its auction services, in the
hope that such items would lead to frenzied bidding and, conse-
quently, higher commissions from buyers. But in 1995, both auction
houses ceased their fierce competition when each announced a new
policy of non-negotiable sellers' commission rates.3 Federal officials
suspected collusion, but their investigation yielded insufficient
evidence. All seemed lost until Christie's did the previously
unimaginable: It presented the authorities with a cache of approxi-
mately 500 pages of documents, mainly handwritten notes, from its
former CEO that detailed his illegal meetings with his counterpart
at Sotheby's and outlined a criminal conspiracy between the firms
even greater in scope than previously suspected.4 Both firms
eventually pled guilty to criminal price fixing,5 and the chairman of
Sotheby's was convicted and imprisoned for his role in the conspir-
acy.6
Federal agents had not suspected that the multi-hundred million
dollar international market in lysine-an amino acid added to
animal feed-was being controlled by a well-heeled cartel. Archer
Daniels Midland (ADM), a major agribusiness concern, started a
new bioproducts division to manufacture lysine in the early 1990s
1. See CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE ART OF THE STEAL 213-14 (2004). For a more detailed
discussion of the auction house cases, see infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
2. See MASON, supra note 1, at 33-34 (explaining the practice of charging auction winners
a "buyers premium").
3. Id. at 161-63, 167-69.
4. Id. at 245-51.
5. Id. at 248-51, 300.
6. Id. at 344-45.
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and named Mark Whitacre as the division's manager.7 Initially, the
division failed to take seed.' Whitacre informed his superiors that
he discovered the reason for ADM's inability to grow lysine when a
stranger called Whitacre, informed him that an internal saboteur at
ADM had contaminated the company's lysine, and offered to remedy
the problem for $10 million.9 Whitacre explained the situation to his
bosses and asked ADM for the money. 1° Through a series of events,
the FBI was called in to investigate. When approached by FBI
agents, Whitacre panicked because there was no saboteur; he had
fabricated the story of industrial sabotage in an attempt to embezzle
money from ADM." In an effort to divert the government's attention
from his own crime, which the FBI had not yet discovered, Whitacre
exposed the fact that ADM had been participating in an interna-
tional lysine cartel. 2 He volunteered to wear a wire and tape his
conversations with his bosses about the cartel. 3 Eventually,
Whitacre worked with the FBI to videotape actual cartel meetings. 4
Once prosecutors secured enough evidence, all of the lysine firms
pleaded guilty and collectively paid over $100 million in criminal
fines.'" But for Whitacre's moment of panic, the lysine cartel would
probably be functioning today.
Although the lysine and auction house cartels operated very
differently, both conspiracies illustrate the difficulty and serendipity
of cartel exposure. Price fixing is fundamentally different from most
other crimes, in that the offense is self-concealing; it leaves no
obvious trace. When police discover a body riddled with bullets, they
commence looking for the murderer. When drums of toxic waste are
found leaching into a lake, it is safe to conclude that illegal dumping
has occurred. Like most felonies, murder and toxic dumping
generally leave telltale signs of criminal activity. In all of these
crimes, the issue is who did it. By contrast, in price-fixing cases, the
7. KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT 12 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of the
lysine case, see infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
8. EICHENWALD, supra note 7, at 15.
9. Id. at 16-18.
10. Id. at 18-19, 36-37.
11. Id. at 38-45.
12. Id. at 50-53.
13. Id. at 69.
14. Id. at 144-59, 213-21.
15. Id. at 503-06, 521-23.
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great mystery is whether the crime happened at all. Because
economic theory predicts that rivals will charge similar prices in
either perfectly competitive or cartelized markets, the presence of
common pricing practices does not necessarily indicate an illegal
agreement to restrain competition. As a result, instead of investiga-
tors first discovering the crime and then looking for the culprit,
cartel conspiracies are most often exposed because an actual
participant in the crime steps forward and confesses. In many
instances, a confession marks the first time that antitrust authori-
ties are aware that the crime had been committed. This represents
an unusual model for law enforcement.
Price-fixing cartels illegally divert billions of dollars from consum-
ers' wallets into the coffers of firms that are committing felonies.
The total harm inflicted by such price fixing is impossible to
estimate accurately because, by definition, successful cartels are
never detected. From just those cartels that have been exposed,
however, we know that cartel overcharges are measured in the
billions of dollars. 6 Although antitrust authorities have enjoyed
recent success in defeating major cartels, much work remains to be
done. Exposing and punishing additional price-fixing conspiracies
requires understanding how cartels operate and where their weak-
nesses lie in order to design enforcement strategies that exploit
those vulnerabilities.
Agency cost theory may help antitrust officials locate and target
a cartel's Achilles' heel. 7 Cartels often have many agency relation-
ships within them. Each firm that belongs to the cartel generally
has several employees who manage the firm's participation in the
cartel, including attending cartel meetings and negotiating terms,
such as the price to be fixed and market share allocations."8 Each
employee who plays a part in the price-fixing conspiracy is an agent
of a firm participating in a criminal enterprise.
This Article argues that antitrust enforcement efforts should
exploit these agency relationships to destabilize cartels. Part I
shows that antitrust enforcement against cartels is necessary. Some
scholars have argued that cartels are inherently unstable because
16. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.B.
1626 [Vol. 49:1621
FINDING VIRTUE IN FAITHLESS AGENTS
of the conspirators' incentives to cheat-by charging a lower price
than the agreed-upon fixed price, or by producing a greater quantity
than their cartel allocation-and thus, cartels will fall apart even
without a vigorous antitrust program.' 9 But experience demon-
strates that many price-fixing conspirators have figured out how to
stabilize a cartel and have consequently been able to secure
supracompetitive profits for decades. For those cartels that are not
destabilized through the risk or actuality of cheating by partici-
pants, prosecutors need to develop alternative mechanisms to create
instability. An antitrust program that creates agency costs within
individual firms can weaken otherwise strong cartels.
Part II begins a discussion on principal-agent relationships. Many
price-fixing cartels have a hierarchical structure in which high-level
decisions are made by senior executives while the cartel's day-to-day
operations are carried out by lower-level managers and salespeople
within each member firm. The connection between the high-ranking
executives and their lower-level employees is a classic principal-
agent relationship. Although most of the literature on agency costs
in employer-employee relationships focuses on how to reduce such
costs, this scholarship assumes that the employer-principal is
pursuing desirable-or at least legal-goals. That assumption does
not hold in cartels because the principals-high-ranking executives
within a cartel firm-are perpetuating a criminal conspiracy. A
faithful agent facilitates illegal price fixing; a faithless agent
exposes the cartel. When, as here, agency costs are socially desir-
able, the law should try to decouple the interests of principal and
agent. This may be difficult to do, Part II explains, because the
interests of cartel member firms and their participating employees
are generally aligned in fixing prices and concealing the conspiracy.
Part III examines mechanisms to decouple the interests of price-
fixing firms and their loyal employees. Every agent within a
participating firm who knows about a cartel should be given a
meaningful incentive to expose the price-fixing activity. Part III
advocates a carrot-and-stick approach. First, faithful agents who
quietly carry out their cartel duties should be subject to severe
punishment, including a greater likelihood of imprisonment for
19. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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those who do not offer early cooperation to federal antitrust
authorities. ° Second, faithless agents who expose illegal cartels
should receive significant rewards, including leniency from criminal
prosecution, immunity from private liability, and substantial
monetary incentives in the form of antitrust bounties. Third,
because agents who distrust their principals are more likely to be
faithless, cartel principals should be given incentives to turn on
their own employees during plea bargaining. Fourth, and finally,
Part III examines mechanisms to more efficiently educate price-
fixing employees about how their interests are not aligned with
their employers' interests.
Part IV considers the possible effects on a cartel of antitrust
policies designed to encourage faithless agents. It first notes that
price-fixing firms will probably reduce the number of cartel agents
and guard information more carefully. This increases the expected
costs of cartelization, a favorable result. Second, every cartel mem-
ber must evaluate the risk that an employee at another firm will
expose the conspiracy. This distrust should increase the pressure to
20. Antitrust differs from many other areas of business law, in that antitrust has
historically targeted the firm, rather than the individual, in criminal cases. A debate ensues
in academic circles over the appropriate role and form of corporate criminal liability as a
general matter. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 833 (1994); Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman,
Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 687 (1997); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319
(1996); Han Hyewon & Nelson Wagner, Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CR1M. L. REV.
337 (2007). However, antitrust is not really part of this discussion because it has long held
corporations criminally liable for certain antitrust violations committed by their employees.
See, e.g., United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting "cases
hold[ing] that a corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations
committed by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their authority, or
apparent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation, even if ... such acts were against
corporate policy or express instructions"). Corporate law scholars may find this Article's
emphasis on individual criminal responsibility odd because in non-antitrust areas of white-
collar crime-such as securities fraud-federal and state authorities have focused on
prosecuting individuals. Why criminal enforcement of antitrust law has evolved differently
and has historically focused on firms rather than individuals is beyond the scope of this
Article and warrants its own study. But what may seem obvious or commonplace in corporate
criminal law generally-namely, emphasizing the punishment of individuals who have
committed white-collar crime-is at odds with antitrust law's traditional focus on holding firms
criminally responsible for antitrust violations. Recently, federal authorities have started to
move beyond this traditional focus and have increased prosecutions of individuals who commit
antitrust crimes. This is a welcome trend, which this Article argues should be built upon.
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expose the cartel as a preemptive move since only the first confessor
receives amnesty from government prosecution. The enhanced fear
of faithless agents creates both a persuasive incentive to confess and
a strong disincentive to join a cartel in the first place, both positive
outcomes.
Finally, Part V examines the potential downsides of efforts to
decouple the interests of principals and agents in suspected price-
fixing firms. These include the risk of undermining beneficial trust
within firms and the possibility of false accusations. Part V explains
why neither concern is particularly worrisome given how cartels
operate and how federal officials approach antitrust prosecutions.
I. CARTEL STABILITY
Price-fixing cartels visit a litany of inefficiencies and related
harms upon market economies. In lieu of competing against each
other in order to increase their own market shares and profits by
engaging in price competition, cartel members agree to increase the
market price and divide the spoils. Successful cartels have been able
to impose markups of 400 percent above competitive prices.2 Recent
cartels have overcharged consumers billions of dollars.22 Because
cartels reduce market output, they generally create significant
allocative inefficiencies.23 In some markets, cartel pricing may also
protect high-cost firms, which would be driven from the market if
lower, competitive prices prevailed. By insulating less efficient firms
from competitive pressures, cartels sometimes facilitate productive
inefficiency as well.24
Fortunately, cartels are often unstable. Although cartel members
collectively increase their profits by charging the inflated fixed price
set by the cartel, each individual firm could maximize its short-term
21. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J.
ECON. LIT. 43, 80 (2006).
22. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices?
Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513, 559-60 (2005).
23. See Nolan Ezra Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelization
Standard, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1135 (1985) (describing the effects of cartelization as,
among others, the concentration of economic power, reduction of output, increased price, and
"reduc[ed] allocative efficiency").
24. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 518
(2004) [hereinafter Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust].
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profits by cheating on the cartel, charging less than the cartel price,
and selling more than its cartel allotment.25 Even firms that entered
into the cartel agreement sincerely may feel compelled to compete
if they perceive that others are cheating. Some commentators have
suggested that this incentive to cheat diminishes the need to focus
significant attention or resources on anti-cartel efforts, since the
conspiracies will inevitably unravel of their own accord.26
Unfortunately, these optimistic predictions are belied by the
historical record, which shows how many real-world cartels have
overcome the problems of instability.27 Successful cartels have
devised mechanisms that enable members to trust one another not
to cheat, such as developing personal relationships among competi-
tors, undertaking goodwill gestures among cartel members, having
frequent and open communications, making price more transparent,
and creating a group identity and attendant social norms of
cooperation among cartel members.28 Once trust among the cartel
members has been established, the temptation to cheat is signifi-
cantly diminished. Moreover, even in the absence of trust, cartels
can achieve stability by devising mechanisms to detect and punish
cheaters, including employing auditors and accounting systems,
requiring deposits and imposing fines on cheaters, and creating
private dispute resolution systems.29
In the face of significant cartel success in establishing stability,
antitrust authorities have nevertheless achieved some major
victories against both domestic and international cartels. For ex-
ample, firms in the lysine, graphite electrodes, vitamin, and other
cartels have pled guilty to price fixing and collectively paid nearly
$2 billion in criminal fines.3" The credit for these successes lies
with the government's Antitrust Amnesty Program. In order to
encourage price-fixing firms to confess their crimes, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice has developed a program
to grant amnesty from criminal prosecution to the first firm to
25. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964).
26. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 21, at 44-46 (citing sources).
27. See id. at 44.
28. See Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 24, at 565-99.
29. See id. at 610-22.
30. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND
RESOURCES FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS vii (2005) [hereinafter ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE].
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expose a cartel and provide prosecutors with evidence against the
other cartel members.3' Not only does the firm receive immunity
from criminal prosecution, but that immunity also extends to its
directors, executives, and employees who cooperate with the govern-
ment's case against the other members of the cartel.32 Prior to 1993,
amnesty for corporations that confessed to price fixing was discre-
tionary.33 Because the Antitrust Division could still prosecute a firm
that exposed a cartel, firms faced a major disincentive against
applying for amnesty; consequently, the government received only
about one application per year. 4 In 1993, the revised Corporate
Leniency Policy made amnesty automatic for the first eligible firm
that confessed." Applications for amnesty skyrocketed, and, in
recent years, price-fixing conspiracies have been exposed at a rate
of two per month.36 While only the first firm to confess is guaranteed
amnesty, subsequent confessors can receive substantial discounts
31. See ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (Aug. 10,
1993), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 0091.pdf [hereinafter CORPORATE LENIENCY
POLICY]. Although it does not receive complete immunity from private suits, the firm that
secures amnesty from the government has its damages in private litigation limited to single
damages instead of treble damages. SeeAntitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 213, 118 Stat. 661, 666-67 (2004); see also R. Hewitt Pate,
Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address Before the Fordham
Corporate Law Institute's 31st Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy:
Current Issues in International Antitrust Enforcement 2 (Oct. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publicspeeches/206479.pdf.
32. Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Address Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Symposium on Corporate Crime in
America: The Experience and Views of the Antitrust Division (Sept. 8, 1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/speechlgrs.htm [hereinafter Spratling, The Expe-
rience and Views of the Antitrust Division].
33. Id. at pt. V.D.
34. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715,
716 (2001).
35. CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 31. To be eligible, the firm could not be the
instigator or ringleader of the cartel; nor would amnesty be automatic if the government was
already investigating the cartel and had collected sufficient evidence. Id.; see also Christopher
R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453, 465-66
(2006) [hereinafter Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty] (criticizing these limitations and advocating
true automatic amnesty for the first confessor).
36. See Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Presentation at the New York State Bar Association Annual Meeting: A Summary
Overview of the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program 5 (Jan. 23, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200686.pdf.
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off of their base criminal fines, with earlier confessors receiving
greater discounts than later confessors. 37 The Amnesty Program is
now the "most effective generator of cartel cases and is believed to
be the most successful program in U.S. history for detecting large
commercial crimes. ''3' Despite these important successes, however,
probably hundreds of price-fixing cartels continue to impose higher
prices on American consumers.
The problem remains that once a stable cartel survives its infancy
and awkward adolescence, it can thrive for decades, despite the
economic incentive to cheat and the potential criminal and civil
penalties for the cartel members, if caught. For example, DeBeers
has successfully managed the international diamond cartel for over
a century. 9 OPEC continues to control the price of petroleum,
disproving early predictions that the cartel would not sustain itself
for any meaningful amount of time. And the duration of exposed
cartels repeatedly demonstrates that price fixers can create robust
conspiracies: The international alkali cartel and the railroad
express cartel each lasted for over half a century.4 ° Alfred Nobel's
dynamite trust controlled the market for almost thirty years, until
the outbreak of World War I." Lesser known international cartels,
such as those in niacin and other commodities, remained stable and
secured cartel profits for over a decade,42 while more localized
domestic cartels, such as those involving school milk, often have
lifespans measured in decades.43 Some studies find the median life
of discovered cartels to have been approximately five to six years."
However, even these numbers may downplay the significance and
37. See Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 35, at 467-68 (providing examples).
38. Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting
Violations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 799 (2001).
39. See The Cartel Isn't Forever-The Diamond Cartel, ECONOMIST, July 17, 2004, at 60.
40. See GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE STUDIES
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 430 (1946) (discussing the alkali cartel); Peter Z.
Grossman, The Dynamics of a Stable Cartel: The Railroad Express 1851-1913, 34 ECON.
INQUIRY 220, 220 (1996).
41. See STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 40, at 438.
42. JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERSARE THE ENEMY 308-10,315-
16 (2001) (discussing the niacin cartel); Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 21, at 44 (noting
that "many cartels measure their duration in decades, not months").
43. See Robert F. Lanzillotti, The Great School Milk Conspiracies of the 1980s, 11 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 413, 440 (1996).
44. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 21, at 44.
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stability of price-fixing conspiracies because many cartels that
appear to fail-including those in Swedish beer, railroad oil, tea,
potash, and sugar---often learn from their early failures and go on
to create stable cartels in the long run.45 Ultimately, a wide range
of markets seem plagued by repeated price-fixing conspiracies,
albeit of varying duration. Professors Levenstein and Suslow note
that "the list of industries with frequent cartel activity is long and
diverse: agriculture; stone, glass, and machinery; chemical and
agricultural food products; textiles; steel; and highway construction,
street construction, and electrical contracting."4
Cartels may continue to exist in part because price fixing remains
profitable. Even though American antitrust law imposes high fines,
international cartels necessarily make profits in other countries
with fewer penalties for price fixing.4 ' For example, although the
members of the vitamins cartel paid almost $1 billion in criminal
fines in the United States and billions more in private damages and
foreign fines, the cartel members still made approximately $4 to $7
billion in excess profits even after paying all fines and damages."
International antitrust authorities have come to realize that
significant corporate fines alone cannot sufficiently deter price-
fixing activity.49
45. See id. at 74 (noting that the "early history of failure characterizes many successful
cartels").
46. Id. at 57 (citations omitted).
47. Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and
Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 833 (2004) ("U.S. fines may be sufficient to provide deterrence if one
focuses on the U.S. market alone, but that may not be the case if the benefits to the cartel are
global.").
48. See Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REv. 329, 341 n.48 (2004) (citing Brief for Professor Darren Bush et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S.
155 (2004) (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 533933 ("This research demonstrates that the international
vitamin cartel generated the largest total of antitrust fines and penalties in history, which are
calculated to be between $4.4 and $5.6 billion. But the cartel's monopoly profits in all areas
of the world were $9 to $13 billion.")).
49. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CARTEL SANCTIONS AGAINST
INDIVDUALS 7 (2003), http://www.oecd.org~dataoecdI61/46/34306028.pdf [hereinafter CARTEL
SANCTIONS] (noting, on behalf of a joint international committee, that "corporate sanctions
rarely are sufficiently high to be an optimal deterrent against cartels").
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A stable cartel can be exceedingly difficult to discover and, thus,
dismantle.50 Cartel members use code names and public phones;
they meet in secret locations, such as the vitamins cartel's covert
meetings in Germany's Black Forest,5' and create false travel
records to cover their tracks.52 Every firm in a cartel knows that it
is better off in the long run by fixing prices and concealing the
conspiracy. This makes successful cartels difficult even to study
because, by definition, they are clandestine.53 Stable cartels also
need less explicit and less frequent communication. Communication
is necessary early on to form a cartel and to build trust, but
members of an established cartel grow to trust each other such that
the same level of communication is no longer necessary. In short,
because they are the longest lived and often need less communica-
tion, stable cartels may cause the most harm and are also the
hardest to uncover and punish.
Given the difficulty of detecting price-fixing conspiracies, anti-
trust authorities should attempt to destabilize cartels by finding
weak links within cartel structures. One approach is to destabilize
individual cartel member firms from within. A cartel, after all,
comprises a chain of firms that have conspired to replace competi-
tion with collusion. Prosecutors need to find the weak link in that
chain. Most anti-cartel efforts have focused on getting one firm to
confess and expose the cartel.54 This Article argues that a weaker
link is found not at the level of the member firms, but rather among
the individuals within each cartel member firm. The individual
employees who manage a firm's cartel operations have intimate
knowledge of the conspiracy and represent a potential chink in the
armor of a price-fixing conspiracy.55 Because these employees are
50. See John Gibeaut, Antitrust American Style, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2004, at 55, 56.
51. Harry First, The Vittamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 714 (2001).
52. See JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER
DANIELS MIDLAND 221 (2000) (discussing the lysine cartel).
53. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE COOPERATIVE EDGE 35 (1994). Although some government-
run cartels, like OPEC, operate openly, most cartels are private enterprises that must conceal
their activities. See id.
54. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 1, at 248-51 (describing the Justice Department's decision
to grant amnesty to Christie's Auction House in order to prosecute Sotheby's).
55. Gibeaut, supra note 50, at 56 ("Cartels are tough nuts to crack, and prosecutors say
help from the inside is crucial in making strong cases.").
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essentially agents of a cartel member firm, agency theory may offer
insights on how to destabilize cartels through these employees.
II. CARTELS AND THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF AGENCY COSTS
Broadly speaking, an agency relationship exists whenever one
individual (the principal) employs another (the agent) to perform a
task intended to create value for the principal."6 In relying on
another person, however, the principal faces the risk that the agent
will pursue her own interests instead of the principal's.5 7 Thus, the
principal must be wary of his agent's motivations and faithfulness."
A. Agency Costs, Faithless Agents, and Unworthy Principals
The tension between a principal and his agents, and the danger
that the agent will be faithless to the principal's interests, are often
described in the language of agency costs. Agency costs have two
major components. First, they include the costs that the principal
incurs in keeping the agents faithful, including monitoring and
bonding costs. 9 Second, agency costs include any losses the prin-
cipal suffers because his agent pursues her own goals. 0
Agency relationships in which faithless agents may create agency
costs abound." For example, agency costs are often discussed in the
56. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 627 (6th ed. 2005).
57. See id.
58. See WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 233 (7th ed. 1997).
59. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 368 (3d ed. 1986) ("[A] gency costs
[are] the costs to the principal of obtaining faithful and effective performance by his agents.");
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market
Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 382 (2000) ("Agency costs are defined as the
sum of the monitoring and bonding costs between principal and agent necessary to deter
disloyal acts on the part of the agents, plus any residual loss incurred due to disloyalty that
cannot be cost-justifiably deterred.").
60. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976); Stewart E. Sterk,
Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOzO L. REv. 2761, 2761 n. 1 (2006)
("Agency costs' refer to the losses suffered by a principal because her agent's interests-and
hence incentives to act-diverge from those of the principal." (citing Jensen & Meckling,
supra)).
61. See, e.g., NICHOLSON, supra note 58, at 233 ("Examples of this [principal-agent]
relationship occur not only in the management of firms, but also in such diverse applications
as hiring investment advisors (do they really put their clients' interest first?); relying on an
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context of publicly held corporations, in which shareholders'
ownership is divorced from day-to-day corporate operations.
Shareholders are principals who must rely on executives and
hundreds or thousands of lower-level employees as their agents to
run the corporation in a manner that maximizes shareholder value.
If the agents were faithless, then they could pursue their own
interests-for example, by increasing their own salaries and perks,
not working efficiently, or even looting or embezzling-at the
expense of the owners' welfare. Indeed, Professors Blair and Stout
have argued that "the central economic problem addressed by
corporation law is reducing 'agency costs' by keeping directors and
managers faithful to shareholders' interests."62
Agency costs also exist in litigation. In the traditional attorney-
client relationship, the client is the principal and the attorney is her
agent.6" The client pays the attorney to be a zealous advocate-to
maximize litigation payouts when the client is a plaintiff and to
eliminate liability or minimize damages when the client is a
defendant. The lawyer acts as a faithless agent when she pursues
her own interests at the expense of her client's. This is a particular
problem in class action litigation because there are so many
putative principals, and none possess sufficient incentive to en-
sure that their agent is protecting their common interests. This
sometimes results in, for example, class counsel negotiating low
settlements in exchange for defendants' payment of relatively high
attorneys' fees.64
Agency costs are generally considered undesirable because they
introduce inefficiency into business operations and professional
relationships. 5 Principals must spend money screening and
monitoring agents, and perhaps purchasing insurance in case an
automobile mechanic's assessment in ordering repairs; and buying clothes for a relative.");
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 56, at 627 (discussing doctors as agents of principal-
hospitals).
62. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 248-49 (1999).
63. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. 11 (2007) (noting that the law of
principal and agent sometimes governs the attorney-client relationship).
64. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REv. 991, 1042-44 (2002)
[hereinafter Leslie, Class Action Litigation].
65. See Blair & Stout, supra note 62, at 258-59.
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agent is faithless in the extreme. Such actions increase costs.
Further, principals may avoid appropriate delegation out of fear of
faithless agents; this could inhibit an organization from achieving
its goals.
There are generally two basic approaches to minimizing the
risk of faithless agents: aligning interests and monitoring. One
traditional solution to agency cost problems is to better bind the
interests of the principal and agent.66 In the context of corporate
management, the binding of interests is often achieved by tying the
agent's compensation to the principal's profitability, such as through
stock options.67 In litigation, the specter of the faithless agent is
often addressed by contingency fees that peg the attorney's remu-
neration to the client's recovery.6" The other traditional response to
agency costs requires the principal to monitor his agents to ensure
that they execute their orders appropriately. 69 Agents are more
likely to shirk their obligations to a principal and pursue their own
interests if they are unobserved or otherwise unaccountable.
Agency cost analysis usually implicitly assumes that the princi-
pal's goals are laudable and, consequently, theorists seek ways to
minimize the risks and costs of agents acting faithlessly. But what
if the principal is a bad actor? Society does not want all organiza-
tions to achieve their goals. The general public obviously suffers
when criminal enterprises-such as drug rings, counterfeiters, or
those dumping hazardous waste-succeed in attaining their goals.
In these instances, agency costs can be socially beneficial if they
frustrate the principal's mission. When the principal is pursuing
illegal, inefficient, or otherwise undesirable goals, the law should
encourage agents to be unfaithful.
Price-fixing cartels warrant condemnation because they unneces-
sarily cost consumers billions of dollars and inflict both allocative
66. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 650-57 (2004) (noting that many fiduciary duties attempt to align the interests of
trustees and beneficiaries).
67. NICHOLSON, supra note 58, at 235 ("By offering such contract options as profit-sharing
bonuses, stock option plans, and company-financed pensions, the owner may be able to give
managers an incentive to be careful about the benefits they choose to take.").
68. See Leslie, Class Action Litigation, supra note 64, at 1048.
69. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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and productive inefficiency on the economy.70 As with other criminal
conspiracies, agency costs in cartels benefit the public by making it
more difficult for the principal to achieve goals that would harm
society at large. If the principal's aim is to participate in a price-
fixing conspiracy, then antitrust law should encourage any cartel
agents to be faithless.
B. Agency Relationships Within Cartels
Cartels require many relationships among different actors. The
most obvious relationships are those among the cartel's member
firms. A cartel, by definition, involves competing firms joining
together to fix prices, divide territory, allocate sales, or otherwise
restrict competition. While the interactions among these firms are
generally the most complicated part of any cartel, these are not
necessarily agency relationships. The cartel members are partners
and co-conspirators-in other words, equals. Although a particular
firm may be the cartel ringleader, it is not the principal, as the other
firms are not merely doing the ringleader's bidding. Each firm
makes an independent decision as to whether joining or remaining
in a cartel is in the firm's own best interest.
But cartels are not devoid of relevant agency relationships. In
most major cartels, each participating firm has its own internal
hierarchy of principals and agents, in which "the primary conspira-
tors are usually high-ranking executives [while] less-senior
corporate intermediaries frequently fine-tune the agreements."71 In
70. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
71. Susan B. Garland, Justice's Cartel Crackdown, Bus. WK., July 27, 1998, at 50-51 ("In
the ADM lysine case, for example, prosecutors charge that senior executives attended only
those meetings necessary to solve big problems, such as volume allocation issues, while
regional sales managers of competitor companies met to work out details on prices in local
markets."); Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 47, at 833 ('The cartel was organized into a 'top-
level' group and a 'working-level' group. The top-level meetings included primarily company
presidents and managing directors and were designed to set policies. Lower-level managers,
who met more frequently, worked out the details of the agreement and its implementation.").
The primary exception would be cartel participants that are sole proprietorships, as in some
of the school milk cartels.
The typical firm in a large cartel is a publicly traded company, in which the shareholders
are the principals and the executives engaging in price fixing are the agents. Some conceive
of the price fixers as the faithless agents. See, e.g., Paolo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo,
Corporate Governance and Collusive Behavior 13 (Lear Research Paper No. 06-01, Aug. 2006),
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many cartels, senior executives-often with decades of seniority-
decide to fix prices with their counterparts at competing firms. 2 But
these high-level decision makers do not necessarily fix the actual
price or allocate market shares, perhaps in part because they know
that price fixing is illegal.73 Instead, the executives actually carry
out the cartel operations through trusted lower-level employees,
including managers and salespeople74 who "possess the knowledge
about prices, costs, sales history, etc., needed to reach an agreement
as to who will bid for what job or what price will be set for what
goods."75 This means that cartels often have dozens of individuals
managing the cartel's operations.76 The two levels of responsibility
within a price-fixing firm are well understood by the cartel partici-
pants and sometimes made even more distinct by the cartel's
internal nomenclature. For example, in the citric acid cartel of the
early 1990s:
available at http://www.learlab.itPublications/Lear-RP-06-O1.pdf. This is not the agency
relationship I am focusing on. It is certainly possible to think of the managers who fix price
as agents of the law-abiding shareholders; thus, the agents are being faithless when they fix
prices. However, this is not a traditional principal-agent problem because although the
executives who engage in price-fixing are arguably being faithless agents with respect to their
shareholder principals, these executives are not necessarily pursuing their own interests at
the stake of principals'; rather, they are pursuing the shareholders' interests albeit through
illegal means. Moreover, illegal price fixing is often ultimately profitable for the shareholders
even when the cartel is caught and successfully prosecuted. CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note
49, at 16-17 (describing the unlikely deterrent effect of corporate fines imposed on managers).
72. SeeANTITRUSTCOMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 50 ("Another perhaps surprising feature
of cartels is that the most senior executives often play a key role in the conspiracy.").
73. See Robert R. Faulkner, Eric R. Cheney, Gene A. Fisher & Wayne E. Baker, Crime by
Committee: Conspirators and Company Men in the Illegal Electrical Industry Cartel, 1954-
1959, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 511, 542-43 (2003) (noting that "upper level managers have an
incentive to delegate cartel formation because price-fixing is illegal").
74. Other cartel agents include the secretaries who keep track of the member firms'
reported monthly sales figures so that adjustments can be made to cartel allotments. See
LIEBER, supra note 52, at 188.
75. Faulkner et al., supra note 73, at 522-23 (citation omitted) ("In most cases cartel
agreements are negotiated by middle managers from the participating companies.").
76. See CONNOR, supra note 42, at 11 ("Initially, only two or three officers were involved
in the planning and execution of the [lysine, citric acid, vitamins, and other global price-fixing]
conspiracies, but eventually each company would contribute at least ten men to a cartel's
maintenance."). Before the criminal case was brought against ADM and its cartel partners
in the food and feed industry, "price-fixing was a work a day endeavor around the globe,
involving scores of corporations and executives." EICHENWALD, supra note 7, at 559.
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[tihe senior executives responsible for determining the broad
outline of the cartel agreement were nicknamed: "the masters."
The lower-level executives responsible for the day-to-day
workings of the cartel were "the sherpas." They shared monthly
sales figures and took stock at the end of the year of each
company's total sales.77
Such hierarchies within cartel firms "separating high-level policy
decisions made by executives from the more frequent ongoing
monitoring and negotiations undertaken by lower-level managers"
are a hallmark of many successful cartels.78
From the perspective of cartel operations, the high-level decision
makers are the principals and the lower-level employees are the
agents who implement the price-fixing scheme.79 Each principal
within a price-fixing firm needs its employees to be faithful agents
who will carry out the cartel's operations and do nothing to
destabilize or expose the cartel. Whenever one of these employees
shirks his duties-or pursues goals contrary to those of his em-
ployer, he inflicts agency costs upon the principal. Of course, the
lower-level employee may be serving multiple principals, so this
may not be a pure principal-agent relationship, but it has enough of
the salient characteristics so that agency theory can inform efforts
to destabilize cartels.8 °
77. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 21, at 73 (citing Kurt Eichenwald, U.S. Wins a
Round Against Cartel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at D1). Some individuals straddled the line
between master and sherpa. See LIEBER, supra note 52, at 192 ("The conspirators [in the citric
acid cartel] called themselves masters and sherpas. Masters were the big-picture people who
made decisions and set policy. Sherpas took orders and did the low-level detail work. Usually,
Cox said, he was a sherpa, but sometimes he functioned as a master.").
78. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 21, at 44; see also Wayne E. Baker & Robert R.
Faulkner, The Social Organization of Conspiracy: Illegal Networks in the Heavy Electrical
Equipment Industry, 58 AM. Soc. REv. 837, 840 (1993) (discussing the transformer cartel, and
noting that "[t]he high-level group, composed of top executives and general managers, met
several times a year to establish price-fixing policies. The working-level group of assistant
general managers, marketing managers, and sales managers executed the agreements struck
by the high-level group, working out operational rules, routines, and details.").
79. Arguably, the cartel itself as an entity could be seen as the ultimate principal. That
does not change our analysis; we still want individuals to be faithless agents. Moreover, an
agent in a corporate hierarchy can serve multiple masters. This project focuses on the agent's
relationship with the principal in the form of her boss who is instructing her to fix prices.
80. Similarly, the high-level decision makers who are the principals with respect to the
lower-level employers are agents in some respects. To that extent, the theory this Article
develops would apply to these senior executives in their agent capacities. For the sake of
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C. Examples of Faithless Agents in Cartels
An examination of exposed cartels reveals many instances of an
employee within a price-fixing firm acting as a faithless agent.
Agents' acts of betrayal have taken several forms. For example,
when government officials investigating suspicions of price fixing in
the corrugated container industry in the 1970s approached George
Connor, a former employee of a firm suspected of being a cartel
member, he agreed to be interviewed in exchange for a grant of use
immunity.81 Connor was faithless to his former principal, and
transcripts of that interview, which were presented to the grand
jury, laid the groundwork for successful prosecution of the cartel.82
Similarly, the participants in the electrical equipment cartels of
the 1950s and 60s seemed resolved to remain silent in the face of
grand jury probes into the firms' identical bids on several Tennessee
Valley Authority projects.83 Overlapping price-fixing and bid-rigging
conspiracies existed in over twenty separate product markets.84
Although the cartel involved scores of individuals, the conspirators
were well disciplined and believed their conspiracy to be invulnera-
ble to government prosecutors. But an employee at one of the
smaller firms-Lapp Insulator-announced that he would not
perjure himself before the grand jury, which threw the management
of General Electric (GE), one of the cartel leaders, "into a tizzy."85
Ultimately, four grand juries subpoenaed 196 people, at least some
of whom owned up to the cartels and explained their operations.'
Those that squealed were faithless, and their betrayal of their
principals led to the successful prosecution of the cartels, with fines,
private liability, and prison for several of the businessmen.87
simplicity, however, this Article will focus on the principal-agent relationship between the
high-level executive and the lower-level employees within a price-fixing firm.
81. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 1985).
82. See id.
83. Gilbert Geis, White Collar Crime: The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Case of
1961, in CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY 141 (Marshall B. Clinard & Richard
Quinney eds., 1967).
84. See id.
85. JOHN HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY: THE STORY OF THE ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 21-22 (1962).
86. Geis, supra note 83, at 141.
87. See id. at 223.
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The highly publicized cartel between the world's two major
auction houses, Sotheby's and Christie's, presents a more recent
example of faithless actions by an individual within a price-fixing
firm. Not long after becoming the chairman of Sotheby's, Alfred
Taubman met with the chairman of Christie's, Sir Anthony
Tennant.88 The two agreed to fix commissions, with the particulars
to be arranged by the CEOs of each firm-Dede Brooks of Sotheby's
and Christopher Davidge, her counterpart at Christie's. 9 Brooks
and Davidge had several clandestine meetings and successfully
agreed to impose fixed, non-negotiable seller's commission rates.9 °
Despite assuring Brooks that he was keeping no records of their
meetings or agreements, Davidge kept copious notes.91 He generated
handwritten accounts, detailing the substance of his meetings with
Brooks so that he could report back to Tennant.92 Davidge's notes
"recounted secret conversations and meetings in apartments,
restaurants and limousines to discuss fixing the commissions paid
by thousands of customers, dividing up superrich clients and a host
of other steps to stifle competition and pump up profits."93 Davidge
retained other documents as well: when Brooks-as a show of good
faith and to assure Davidge that their agreement was being
implemented-faxed him a copy of an internal Sotheby's memo
detailing the new minimum commissions, Davidge added it "to the
burgeoning pile of potentially incriminating documents he was
keeping under lock and key."94 Davidge ultimately compiled a
collection of almost 500 pages of material detailing every important
aspect of the illegal collusion.95
88. MASON, supra note 1, at 97-100.
89. Id. at 133.
90. Id. at 133-35.
91. Id. at 135.
92. Id. at 142 ("After meeting with Brooks, Davidge took out a legal pad and jotted down
a couple of pages of notes summarizing their conversation. He wanted to give Tennant a
detailed report of the topics and conclusions he and Brooks had reached, and thought it wise
to keep a record of their discussions in case of any unforeseen repercussions."); see also
Douglas Frantz, Private Files Fuel an Art Auction Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, at Al.
93. Frantz, supra note 92.
94. MASON, supra note 1, at 170.
95. Richard Gruner, Avoiding Fines Through Offense Monitoring, Detection, and
Disclosure: The Race for Amnesty, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2001, at 273, 281 (PLI Corp.
Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1248, 2001).
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Davidge created and maintained this stockpile of evidence as his
exit strategy, in case either the government ever prosecuted the
cartel-in which case he might trade key evidence for immunity--or
Christie's tried to do him wrong. When both prospects seemed
possible in 1999 after Tennant had been replaced as chairman,
Davidge dropped the bombshell on Christie's that the firm had
committed a serious felony under Tennant and that Davidge would
strike a deal for himself if Christie's failed to give him an acceptable
severance package or attempted to exclude him from any deal that
Christie's made with American antitrust prosecutors.96 With
Davidge's notes as its bargaining chip, Christie's ultimately ne-
gotiated an amnesty deal with federal prosecutors in exchange for
its cooperation in the government case against Sotheby's.9 In the
end, Christie's was forced to expose its participation in the cartel
only because of the threat from its faithless agent. The exposure
created hundreds of millions of dollars in private liability for both
firms, and led to the conviction of Taubman. 98
The most faithless cartel agent of all, however, has to be Mark
Whitacre. Whitacre exposed the international lysine cartel involv-
ing ADM, two Japanese producers, and two Korean producers of
lysine.99 He did so not because he felt any remorse about his
participation in the criminal conspiracy; rather, Whitacre feared
that the FBI agents would discover his other crimes unless their
attention was focused on bringing down the lysine cartel. Audio-
tapes and videotapes that Whitacre either made or helped secure
caused the downfall of the lysine cartel,'00 including guilty pleas by
all of the firms involved and most of the Japanese and Korean
executives involved.' °' When ADM executives pleaded not guilty,' 2
the videotapes formed the foundation of the prosecution's successful
96. See MASON, supra note 1, at 246-49.
97. Id. at 248-51; Gruner, supra note 95, at 296-97.
98. MASON, supra note 1, at 296-98, 343-46.
99. Details for this paragraph are primarily from EICHENWALD, supra note 7.
100. See id. at 131-36, 146-47, 152-57, 168-69, 179-83, 190-92, 200-01, 204-06, 216-23.
101. See id. at 503-06.
102. This included Whitacre himself for some of the price fidng that he participated in
before becoming a government informant. He would have received immunity from this but for
his breach of the terms of his cooperation agreement with the government. Id. at 506, 539,
541-42.
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case.0 3 All of the defendants went to prison.10 4 Whitacre brought
down the lysine cartel and generated the evidence that led to the
imprisonment of his boss. In short, Whitacre was a faithless agent.
These are all instances of faithless agents within price-fixing
conspiracies. Each had promised to implement the cartel agree-
ments as directed by their respective principals, the bosses at their
firms. Each had implicitly or explicitly promised not to talk to
investigators, not to confess before a grand jury, not to take notes,
and certainly not to videotape cartel meetings. These examples
illustrate how agents, by betraying their principals, can topple
cartels.
D. The Wisdom of Targeting Agents
These examples demonstrate why antitrust authorities should
focus more anti-cartel efforts on individuals. Individual employees
within price-fixing firms represent attractive targets for anti-cartel
efforts for several reasons. First, because more individuals than
firms participate in any given cartel, individuals form a greater pool
of potential defectors. Furthermore, some cartels require multiple
levels of employees within each conspiring firm. For example, in the
vitamin cartel, senior executives of each firm held top-level meet-
ings to set price and production quotas, but midlevel executives
oversaw the actual cartel operations and made any necessary
adjustments.0 5 Each individual is capable of exposing the cartel;
each one is a potential weak link in the chain.
Second, individuals are subject to unique leverage: prison. Even
when firms are caught price fixing, the illegal conduct may still
prove net-profitable. '06 The individual makes an attractive target for
103. See id. at 551-52.
104. See id. at 557-58.
105. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. Outlines How Makers of Vitamins Fixed Global Prices, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 1999, at Al.
106. See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 52, at 33-34 (noting that criminal fines and civil
settlements did not disgorge the ill-gotten gains of the lysine cartel); see also Buccirossi &
Spagnolo, supra note 71, at 14 (noting that empirical research and "[black of the envelope
calculations show that, given current resources of law enforcement agencies ... the Beckerian
optimal fine may be above most firms' ability to pay, so that in many jurisdictions actual fines
are insufficient to discourage the formation of cartels" (citations omitted)); John M. Connor
& Darren Bush, Deterring International Cartels in the Face of Comity and Jurisdiction: A
Legal, Economic, and Empirical Evaluation of the Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
[Vol. 49:16211644
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anti-cartel efforts because the individual's participation can more
easily be rendered not cost-beneficial through the prospect of
imprisonment. °7 Certainly, the fear of prison largely motivated
Mark Whitacre to expose the lysine cartel. 10 8 Antitrust authorities
have repeatedly reaffirmed that "individual accountability through
the imposition of jail sentences is the single greatest deterrent."'0 9
Third, a faithless agent can often be motivated to document the
cartel and expose it for personal, sometimes nefarious, reasons.
Although he had risen to the top of Christie's, Christopher Davidge
was a man with unresolved personal issues. Unlike other Christie's
executives, Davidge came from the lower-middle class, having been
raised in a government housing project in North London." 0 His job
immediately prior to his ascension had been running the catalog
printing division at Christie's."' Coming from a significantly lower
social class, Davidge resented his employer, even as he rose to lead
the company." 2 After a French billionaire had acquired control over
Antitrust Law 32-36 (Apr. 2, 2007), available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=978846.
The expected profitability of price fixing also means that the traditional solution to solving
traditional agency costs in the corporate context-giving managers a greater equity stock in
the firm-actually increases the manager's incentives to engage in price fixing because she
can expect a positive net value even if the cartel is punished.
107. See Scott D. Hammond, When Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Applying for
Corporate Amnesty, How Do You Put a Price Tag on an Individual's Freedom?, in CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE 2001, at 325, 335 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-
1248, 2001).
108. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
109. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Address Before the Paris Working Party No. 3 Prosecutors Program: Ten Strategies for
Winning the Fight Against Hardcore Cartels 3 (Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/212270.pdf.
110. See MASON, supra note 1, at 61-66.
111. Id. at 65-66.
112. See Frantz, supra note 92. Frantz detailed Davidge's family history at Christie's:
At the heart of the inquiry is Mr. Davidge, 55, the former chief executive who
never really fit in at the stuffy pinnacle of the British upper class, where
bloodlines and old-school ties are prized.
Mr. Davidge was the third generation of his family employed by Christie's and
by far the most successful. But he never forgot the fate of the first family
member to work there, his grandfather. He was a clerk at Christie's when he
died at 44.
Not long ago, Mr. Davidge described to a friend what the family said had
followed his grandfather's death. Two Christie's representatives paid a call on
his grandmother and explained that she would get a pension of seven pounds a
month, a miserly amount even at the time. As part of the deal, they suggested
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Christie's, Davidge and the new owner clashed and Davidge's forced
departure seemed imminent.113 When he felt that Christie's was
casting him aside, Davidge revealed the evidence of price fixing to
Christie's outside counsel;1 4 this essentially was a blackmail
strategy in which Davidge traded his cooperation with American
antitrust prosecutors in exchange for Christie's providing a multi-
million dollar severance package and indemnifying him against all
fines and private liability, as well as paying his legal fees."5
Similarly, in the plumbing fixtures cartel, the executive secretary
of the Plumbing Fixtures Manufacturers Association secretly taped
the cartel meetings so that he could embezzle funds from the
association and blackmail the members if he was ever caught."6 His
faithless act exposed the cartel when the government discovered the
tapes during an unrelated investigation.1
7
Fourth, targeting individuals could be a cost-effective anti-cartel
strategy because the government only needs to flip one key em-
ployee in order to unravel the conspiracy. Christopher Davidge kept
copious notes, which forced Christie's to make a deal with the
Antitrust Division." 8 Mark Whitacre created or helped generate the
videotape and audiotape evidence that brought down the lysine
cartel." 9 If prosecutors can get just one employee with credible
evidence of cartel activity to betray his principal, then the entire
she send her young son, Roy, to work at the auction house.
Roy Davidge rose to company secretary, an administrative post, but he never
earned enough to move his family out of public housing. Still, he persuaded his
son Christopher, who was 20, to join the firm as an apprentice printer in 1965.
It is a wonder young Davidge took the job. In an interview several years ago
with The Sunday Telegraph of London, he said he grew up disliking Christie's
because of its treatment of his father, who died at 54. 'The chap next door who
worked as a butcher's assistant earned more than my father," he said.
Id.
113. See MASON, supra note 1, at 237 (discussing how Davidge and Hindlip had a huge
falling out that led to the new owner promising Hindlip that Davidge would be fired); see also
Frantz, supra note 92.
114. See MASON, supra note 1, at 242-44.
115. See Gruner, supra note 95, at 296-98; see also In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig.,
196 F.R.D. 444, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Indemnification and Joint Defence Agreement
between Christie's and Christopher Davidge).
116. See David E. Mills & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Cartel Problems: Comment, 68 AM. ECON.
REV. 938, 940 n.5 (1978).
117. See id.
118. See Frantz, supra note 92.
119. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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cartel will be exposed. Once the first individual flips and provides
evidence to prosecutors, other conspirators will often see the writing
on the wall and rush to make deals with the government. In many
cases, it can be much easier to flip one individual employee than to
convince a corporation that it should confess because any corporate
decision to confess may require agreement among multiple individu-
als at the firm.
Finally, faithless agents can play the key role in creating and
supplying the evidence necessary to prosecute price fixing success-
fully. Solid evidence is the key to prosecuting and dismantling
cartels. 2 ' It is not enough for prosecutors to "know" that a cartel
exists. For example, in the case of Sotheby's and Christie's, although
the Department of Justice had been investigating the auction
houses for suspected antitrust violations, the lack of inside informa-
tion significantly hampered the government's investigation. 2'
Davidge's notes saved the prosecution.'22 Cartel members sometimes
maintain written records because cartel "agreements may be very
complex, due to the variety of products and prices involved, and to
the number of possible contingencies; limited memory may then call
for keeping notes about the agreement."'23 When a government
investigation appears underway, cartel operatives are often com-
manded to destroy all incriminating documents.'24 Although loyal
employees follow such orders, faithless ones retain evidence as their
own personal insurance policy.
120. See Gary R. Spratling, Transparency in Enforcement Maximizes Cooperation from
Antitrust Offenders, in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP 2001, at 374 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1230, 2001). Also, American antitrust
prosecutors need a sufficient quantum of evidence before even starting an investigation. See
id.
121. See Frantz, supra note 92 (describing the government's investigation as "nearly
defunct" before the discovery of Davidge's notes); see also Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn
Graddy, Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and
Christie's 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10795, 2004), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10795.
122. See DAVID BOiES, COURTING JUSTICE 327 (2004) (discussing the Davidge papers and
noting that "[a]fter a two-year investigation that had made little progress, here was the
mother lode").
123. Cbcile Aubert, Patrick Rey & William E. Kovacic, The Impact of Leniency and
Whistleblowing Programs on Cartels 29 (June 21, 2005), available at http://idei.fr/doc/by/rey/
leniency.pdf.
124. See LIEBER, supra note 52, at 155-56; Aubert et al., supra note 123, at 28.
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The faithless employee may be the most efficient mechanism for
collecting the evidence necessary to expose and convict price fixers.
Individual employees can take notes, keep diaries, and record actual
price-fixing meetings.125 Evidence handed over by such employees
can be used to pressure other cartel members to confess and present
any documents they possess, which can be used against the
remaining cartel members who have not confessed. In the graphite
electrodes cartel, prosecutors employed this tactic to secure guilty
pleas and over $100 million in criminal fines.'26 Using evidence
provided by employees increases the efficiency of both investigations
and court proceedings.' 27 Also, in the case of evidence located
abroad, which is common with international cartels, employees can
provide information that subpoenas cannot reach. 2 ' And even
without physical evidence, insiders can detail the participants,
scope, and duration of the cartel,'29 which can help prosecutors
obtain search warrants to secure incriminating evidence and can
be critically persuasive at trial.3 ' As with many conspiracies,
successful antitrust prosecution requires individuals who will testify
against the defendants.' 3 ' For example, antitrust "prosecutors
125. See Investigation Profile: How We Build Our Cases, STATUS REP. (Atlanta Field
Office of the U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div., Atlanta, Ga.), Spring 1999, at 4, 5, available
at http://www.polk.edu/purchasing/WebSite/Forms/AntiTrust2NEWS99.pdf [hereinafter
Investigation Profile].
126. CONNOR, supra note 42, at 492.
127. Cf. CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 47 (discussing Australian approach to anti-
cartel efforts and leniency).
128. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, HANDBOOK ON GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS 279-
80 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS].
129. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION HANDBOOK 80
(2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION].
130. See Hammond, supra note 107, at 329 n.4 (detailing how a cartel member "provided
the Division with information that allowed us to obtain warrants to search the offices of
several of the [graphite electrodes] cartel members. The execution of the warrants, together
with the other cartel members' knowledge of an insider's cooperation, quickly led to the guilty
pleas of other co-conspirators.'); Investigation Profile, supra note 125, at 5 ('The use of search
warrants has proven to be a highly effective tool in obtaining powerful documentary evidence
that may well have been destroyed had the conspirators known about the investigation before
the search team arrived.").
131. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950) ("Courts have
countenanced the use of informers from time immemorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other
cases when the crime consists of preparing for another crime, it is usually necessary to rely
upon them or upon accomplices because the criminals will almost certainly proceed covertly.");
Ann C. Rowland, Effective Use of Informants and Accomplice Witnesses, 50 S.C. L. REV. 679,
697 (1999) ("It is a rare federal criminal trial that does not require the use of criminal
1648
FINDING VIRTUE IN FAITHLESS AGENTS
must prove criminal intent, which can be tricky in the absence of
trustworthy informants."'' 2 Witnesses can also explain ambiguous
documents. Thus, in the lysine cartel, one Japanese executive who
pled guilty to criminal price fixing testified against his American
counterparts, explaining that the agendas for meetings of the so-
called lysine trade association were fake-"simply paperwork to
explain why the lysine competitors had gathered in the same hotel
room."'
13 3
In sum, cartel employees are uniquely vulnerable, susceptible to
persuasion, and able to secure critical evidence. That makes them
the perfect targets for antitrust investigators.
E. Aligned Interests: Cartel Employees' Incentives To Be Faithful
Agents
Agency cost analysis explains that agents are much more likely
to be faithful if their interests align with their principals' interests.
Although agents inside a cartel are potential weak links that can
defeat a price-fixing conspiracy, it may nevertheless be hard to
convince cartel employees to betray their bosses because employees
may conclude that fixing prices and concealing cartel conduct is in
their best interest. It is clear why firms join cartels: profits are
maximized. It may be less clear why individual employees partici-
pate in illegal price fixing. Through a combination of carrots and
sticks, firms attempt to make it in their employees' self-interest to
break the law, thus essentially aligning the interests of a price-
fixing firm and its employees in both fixing price and concealing the
cartel.
Individual employees can gain from fixing price and managing
cartel operations because price fixing often increases their total
compensation, either through direct payments or increasing their
stock value. Employees of firms belonging to the folding-carton
cartel, for example, sometimes received over half of their compensa-
tion in the form of bonuses, which were essentially determined by
witnesses .... ").
132. Gibeaut, supra note 50, at 58.
133. EICHENWALD, supra note 7, at 217; see also CONNOR, supra note 42, at 420 ("Mimoto
testified that documents were prepared to cover up the true purpose of the lysine meetings:
'It was camouflage ... There was a fake agenda ..... ).
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how well they could fix and stabilize prices.'34 Such payments are
perfectly logical. Although the corporation "receives the direct
benefit from the individual's cartel conduct,"135 employees may
demand a premium for engaging in illegal activity and, flush with
cartel profits, price-fixing firms are often willing to share the
spoils.' 6 Both parties gain financially from the conspiracy.
Related to the direct financial rewards, some employees feel that
participating in price fixing is in their interest out of a sense of
loyalty to their employer, who treats them well and provides job
security.'37 Many price fixers are motivated by a sincere desire to
help their company's bottom line.'38 In sentencing defendants in the
electrical equipment cartel cases, one judge chastised the executives
as:
torn between conscience and an approved corporate policy, with
the rewarding objective of promotion, comfortable security, and
large salaries. They were the organization or company man, the
conformist who goes along with his superiors and finds balm for
his conscience in additional comforts and security of his place in
the corporate set-up. 139
Finally, individual employees are also rewarded within the firm
through social norms in which successful price fixers receive the
respect and esteem of their superiors and work colleagues. 4 °
In addition to the potential personal payoff for individual
employees who assist in running the cartel, the interests of the
principal and agent are also aligned in price fixing to the extent that
if an employee does not participate, he is punished. Executives who
134. See Jeffrey Sonnenfeld & Paul R. Lawrence, Why Do Companies Succumb to Price
Fixing?, HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1978, at 145, 149.
135. CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 100.
136. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1341 (2003) ("As with
any employment contract, a conspirator will expect compensation for her input and labor
costs, and will also seek some premium for her legal risks.").
137. See Baker & Faulkner, supra note 78, at 842.
138. See F. Joseph Warin, David P. Burns & John W.F. Chesley, To Plead or Not To Plead?:
Reviewing a Decade of Criminal Antitrust Trials, ANTITRUST SOURCE, July 2006, at 4,
available at http://www.abanet.organtitrust/at-sourceO6/07/JulO6-Warin7=20f.pdf.
139. Geis, supra note 83, at 146; see also ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 31
('The history of antitrust prosecutions is rife with examples of ministerial employees who
participated in the crime even though they personally would not profit.").
140. See Warin et al., supra note 138.
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do not cooperate with price fixing are transferred or dismissed. 4'
For example, GE "relieved" a manager who would not fix prices for
electrical equipment,4 2 and ADM fired an employee who refused to
cooperate with one of its cartels.'43 Raising the stakes for individuals
even more, in the folding-carton cartel, "some executives threatened
others with physical violence if they resisted raising prices."'44 At
the height of the electrical equipment cartel, GE may not have
threatened physical violence, but it did rely on coercion and strong
social norms to pressure its executives to fix prices.'45 One GE
executive had been so "'chewed out' for his inability to get prices
'stabilized"' in his segment of the electrical equipment industry that
he was driven to suicide; the "suicide stunned General Electric
executives and other high echelon managers in other companies.
But life and meetings in the electrical industry went on."'46 Testi-
mony from the price fixers after the exposure of the electrical
equipment cartels suggests that the threat of reprimand "if they
failed to conform to price-fixing expectations" drove the individual
cartel agents more than the promised rewards.'47
The interests of the firm and its employees are also aligned in
concealing the price-fixing activity. From the firm's perspective,
exposure may subject it to hundreds of millions of dollars in
criminal and civil liability. But each individual employee also has
strong incentives to conceal cartel activity. First, exposure of the
cartel could subject the individual to criminal fines and to civil
liability from both consumer antitrust suits and shareholder
derivative suits. 148 Second, exposure creates the possibility of jail
time. Individual employees clearly do not want to be convicted and
141. Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, supra note 134, at 157 n.ll ("Executives who were
uncooperative with price-fixing training were transferred by the company.").
142. JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICE-FIXERS IN
THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 133-34 (1962).
143. CONNOR, supra note 42, at 145 n.7; LIEBER, supra note 52, at 199 (noting that "an
ADM employee named Wayne Brasser had been fired for refusing to participate in citric acid
price-fixing").
144. Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, supra note 134, at 149.
145. Id. ("A GE vice president describing the type of coercion placed on an executive who
resisted the norms of collusion stated, 'We worked him over pretty hard, and I did too; I admit
it."').
146. HERLING, supra note 85, at 250.
147. Geis, supra note 83, at 146.
148. See CONNOR, supra note 42, at 84-85, 382-83, 454; Gruner, supra note 95, at 312-13.
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sentenced to prison. 149 Third, most employees need to conceal the
cartel in order to keep their jobs. For example, the members of the
vitamin cartel ordered executives "to destroy all records and notes
of their meetings or face possible termination if anyone found
out."'5 ° Just as the careless agent risks termination, the faithless
agent who exposes the cartel is almost bound to be fired.'5 ' Finally,
individuals may desire to conceal the cartel out of a sense of loyalty
to the firm. Employees have personal relationships among their
work colleagues. Most individuals would not want to expose the
cartel because they fear the social stigma of being a snitch; whistle-
blowers commonly face harassment and ostracization. 5 2 Exposure
of cartel activity could also harm the agent's colleagues by imperil-
ing the firm's financial situation, forcing layoffs, and significantly
reducing employee compensation and shareholder value, all of
which happened to Sotheby's in the aftermath of the auction house
price-fixing scandal.'53 In short, once the price fixing begins, the
employees within each cartel member firm share their employers'
incentives to conceal the criminal activity from the outside world.
III. DECOUPLING INTERESTS FROM THE AGENT'S PERSPECTIVE
Although a single employee can be the key to bringing down a
cartel, most cartel agents who are aware of price-fixing activity have
insufficient reason to expose it.' Agency cost theory teaches that
agents are less likely to be faithless when their interests are in sync
with the principal's goals. In an effort to create faithless agents
within cartels, antitrust law should decouple the interests of the
149. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. Firms also have an interest in their
executives not going to jail. When firms have employees in prison for price fixing, they lose
valuable workers and risk damaging relationships with their suppliers and customers. See
Gregory J. Werden & Marilyn J. Simon, Why Price Fixers Should Go to Prison, 32 ANTITRUST
BULL. 917, 936-37 (1987).
150. Labaton, supra note 105.
151. See First, supra note 51, at 720 n.37 ("ADM had fired Whitacre shortly after learning
of his role as an informant [who exposed the lysine cartel] and accused him of embezzling
company funds." (citing Thomas M. Burton & Scott Kilman, Three Ex-ADM Executives Are
Indicted-Wilson, Michael Andreas and Informant Whitacre Cited in Antitrust Case, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 4, 1996, at A3)).
152. See BOIES, supra note 122, at 234.
153. Ashenfelter & Graddy, supra note 121, at 15-16.
154. See CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 8.
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cartel principals and their employees.'55 The following Sections
consider several avenues for doing so: punishing employees for
faithfully fulfilling their cartel duties; rewarding employees who
defect from the cartel; convincing employees to distrust their price-
fixing bosses; altering the expected costs and benefits of faithful and
faithless conduct; and educating employees as to why exposing
cartels serves their interests.
A. Punishing the Faithful Agent
One obvious way to encourage employees to betray a price-fixing
boss is to punish them for being faithful. In theory, levying signifi-
cant sanctions against individual employees should deter them from
participating in price fixing and encourage them to expose cartels,
including by providing evidence sufficient to convict the conspira-
tors. Antitrust authorities attempt to fashion the appropriate level
of individual penalty that will cause cartel insiders to cooperate
with antitrust enforcement officials.
Fines are the most common sanction against firms and individu-
als caught engaging in cartel activity. Although most headline-
grabbing fines are against firms, individual employees have reached
settlements to pay significant criminal fines, sometimes as high as
$10 million.'56 Upon his conviction in the auction house cartel case,
Sotheby's chairman Alfred Taubman was ordered to pay a criminal
fine of $7.5 million, which represented one-fifth of his assets.
5 7
Despite the theoretical possibility of designing the optimal fine,
financial penalties may not be enough to deter individuals from
participating in price-fixing activity. In some cases, individuals have
spent all of their ill-gotten gains from price fixing long before the
imposition of criminal sanctions. Thus, a court cannot impose a
substantial fine that the defendant can actually pay.' 5 By making
155. See id.
156. Gruner, supra note 95, at 277 n.9; see also CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra
note 129, at 466-67. As of 2004, more than forty corporations have paid criminal antitrust
fines of $10 million or more. Murray J. Laulicht, Recent Developments in Criminal and Civil
Price-Fixing Cases, N.J. LAW. MAG., June 2004, at 26, 27, available at 228 NJLAW 26
(Westlaw).
157. Ashenfelter & Graddy, supra note 121, at 11, 16. Taubman was also sentenced to a
year and a day in prison. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
158. See CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 72 (discussing Israeli case involving PVC
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themselves essentially judgment-proof, individual cartel operatives
can effectively prevent antitrust enforcers from imposing the
optimal fine that would deter price fixing in the first place.'59
Furthermore, individuals can be compensated by their employers
-- directly and indirectly-for financial penalties against price
fixing. The law tries to prevent such reimbursement by prohibiting
indemnification for criminal fines. 6 ' This is sound policy because
indemnification arrangements align the interests of the principal
and the agent in price fixing; specifically, they remove one of the
agent's disincentives to breaking the law and, thus, encourage
criminal behavior.' In theory, eliminating indemnification should
increase deterrence by forcing the agent to personally bear the
brunt of any antitrust penalties.'62 Unfortunately, forbidding
indemnification or reimbursement alone does not necessarily render
price fixing unprofitable for the individual because such prohibitions
can be circumvented. For example, the "reimbursement" can be paid
upfront in the executive's salary, as either a risk premium or the
actual amount of expected fines, including legal costs.16
The ease of evading individual fines counsels in favor of imprison-
ing employees who participate in criminal cartel activities. Impris-
onment as a punishment for price fixing is less susceptible to
evasion than monetary penalties."6 A firm cannot easily compensate
its employees for time spent in a federal prison.'65 Also, the threat
pipe cartel).
159. See id. at 17 (noting that the "[optimal] fine might exceed statutory ceilings and/or the
individual's ability to pay").
160. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001); Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations
on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's
Clash with Donaldson over Turf, the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic
of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 462 n.76 (2004) ("Corporate
indemnification for criminal fines is not allowed under state corporate statutes unless 'he had
no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful.- (quoting MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 8.51(a)(1)(iii) (2005))).
161. Katyal, supra note 136, at 1384-85.
162. See id.
163. See CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 17.
164. See id. at 100 ('If the individual is subject only to a fine, he could escape punishment
altogether by having his employer pay the fine. In most cases, it is impracticable, if not
impossible, to prevent a company from finding a way to reimburse an employee for any fine
paid. Therefore, incarceration is the single greatest deterrent to the commission of antitrust
offenses.").
165. See CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 129, at 90.
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of imprisonment works against individuals regardless of their
ability to pay the optimal fine.'66 Thus, prison has the advantage
that it forces the convicted to pay their debt to society.
Imprisonment also has the additional benefit of imposing a
significant social stigma, the threat of which can itself be a powerful
disincentive to price fixing."6 7 Some argue that business executives
may find the stigma of imprisonment much more of a deterrent than
non-white-collar criminals.'68 Certainly, some executives have
shown that they do not want to be associated with the latter. In the
electrical equipment cartel, the counsel for one GE senior manager
decried that it would be "cold-blooded" to put this executive in
prison with "common criminals."'69 And just as a cartel firm cannot
easily reimburse its imprisoned employees for the loss of liberty
they suffer, it cannot easily compensate them for the social stigma
of serving hard time. 7 '
An individiual's desire to avoid imprisonment operates on an
emotional level, not just an economic one. A firm's decision either to
participate in or expose a cartel is, by contrast, fundamentally an
economic decision. The imprisonment penalty does not drive the
firm's decision making in the way that it can motivate individuals
to cooperate with antitrust authorities. Indeed, "executives' fear of
getting tossed into the clink probably does more to fuel the race to
166. See CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 15 ("whether or not it is legally possible to
impose an optimal organisational fine and practically possible to calculate it in a given case,
actually imposing it might present problems. The optimal fine could simply be too large for
the entity to bear, causing bankruptcy and possible exit from the market, which itself could
diminish competition. Thus, there is a place for sanctions against natural persons, placing
them at risk individually for their conduct. Such sanctions can complement organisational
fines and provide an enhancement to deterrence." (citation omitted)).
167. Werden & Simon, supra note 149, at 935 ("[A] major portion of the disutility
businessmen experience as a result of imprisonment is the stigma and humiliation associated
with incarceration .... ); see also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 89 (2000) ('The
average white collar criminal fears the shame of a prison term more than a fine, which is not
so shameful.").
168. See CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 100. Also, serving time in person can reduce
one's employability upon release. See Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 24, at
647 ("In addition to the criminal stigma, being out of the loop while in prison can reduce an
executive's business connections, development of relevant skills, and maintenance of
necessary personal relationships.").
169. Geis, supra note 83, at 140 (quoting Anthony Lewis, 7 Electrical Officials Get Jail
Terms in Trust Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1961, at Al).
170. See CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 129, at 90.
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the prosecutor than anything else."'71 In short, people may be
willing to gamble more freely with the corporation's money than
with their own freedom.
Although the Sherman Act criminalized price fixing in 1890, a
lengthy prison term for violators was not a serious threat until
1974. Until then, price fixing was a misdemeanor with a one-year
maximum sentence; most convicted price fixers were sentenced to
no jail time and those who were sentenced generally received
suspended sentences of thirty days or less.'72 In 1974, Congress
made price fixing a felony and increased the maximum prison
sentence to three years. 7 ' Since then, the government has more
vigorously pursued imprisonment as a punishment.7 4 Most signif-
icantly, in 2004, Congress considerably increased the maximum
sentence to ten years.7 5 While this presents an opportunity to
increase deterrence of individuals agreeing to participate in cartel
171. Gibeaut, supra note 50, at 59 (citing Washington plaintiffs lawyer Kenneth L.
Adams).
172. CONNOR, supra note 42, at 434. Breit and Elzinga reviewed the early sentences for
price fixing:
From 1940 to 1955 only eleven prison sentences were imposed, and in almost
every case the sentences were suspended. It was not until 1959 that a prison
sentence was imposed for price-fixing alone, in which no acts of violence or union
misconduct were involved. In that case the court imposed a ninety-day prison
term on four individuals and fined each $5,000. The year 1960 saw the advent
of the notorious electrical equipment cases. By 1966, at the termination of these
cases, seven company officials had received thirty-day jail terms, a fact that led
a number of observers to believe that a new era had been ushered in. But this
belief proved premature. From 1966 to 1973 only eighteen cases resulted in the
imposition of jail sentences. In only seven of these was time actually served, as
compared to the 1955-1965 period when twenty-six cases resulted in jail
sentences with only six actually served.
WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
52 (1986) (citation omitted).
173. CONNOR, supra note 42, at 434.
174. Whether following criminal convictions or plea agreements, executives from the lysine,
vitamins, graphite electrodes, and auction house cartels all served prison sentences in the
United States. This includes foreign executives from countries including Canada, Germany,
France, Sweden, and Switzerland. J. Anthony Chavez, Prosecution of International Cartels
and Compliance Programs, in 44TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE, at 820-21 (PLI Corp.
Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1371, 2003).
175. See CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 129, at 2 (citing Antitrust Criminal
Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, tit. II, § 215(a), 118 Stat.
661, 668 (2004)).
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schemes, much will depend on how prosecutors and courts put into
practice the new possibility of longer sentences.
When the maximum sentence was one year, convicted price fixers
served mere days in prison, if that. After Congress increased the
maximum sentence to three years, although some sentences did
increase, prosecutors and judges routinely resisted imposing the
maximum.176 For example, even after a jury convicted ADM's
executives of price fixing in the billion dollar international lysine
market-based largely on the videotapes of their actual cartel
meetings 77 -the district court judge declined to impose three-year
sentences, opting instead for two-year sentences, despite the fact
that the convictions represented the most significant criminal
antitrust convictions in history.
178
Some commentators have suggested that prison sentences need
not be long for price fixers because merely having to serve any time
in prison has a sufficient deterrent effect on business executives
that it would not have for other criminals.'79 While prison terms
should deter price fixing, short sentences may not suffice. 8 ° First,
longer sentences communicate the gravity of the crime, both to
actual and would-be price fixers.'8 ' Second, even as average prison
terms have risen to approximately eighteen months for price fixing,
businesspeople continue to form and participate in cartels.8 2 This
176. However, statistics show that the average prison sentence for price fixing increased
in the first three years since 2000. See Gibeaut, supra note 50, at 59.
177. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
178. United States v. Andreas, No. 96-CR-762, 1999 WL 515484, at *13 (N.D. Ill. July 15,
1999). The government later successfully appealed in United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645,
679-80 (7th Cir. 2000).
179. See CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 20 (discussing the assumption "that even
short term prison sentences are viewed by business executives as extremely undesirable and
costly, and that the stigma and reputational losses associated with a criminal conviction to
serve time in jail would exist for any non-trivial time in jail"); Gibeaut, supra note 50, at 59
("Six months in jail has a very different effect on the future and lifestyle of a corporate CEO
than it does on a drug dealer." (quoting Washington plaintiffs lawyer Kenneth L. Adams)).
180. See CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 8.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 101 ('CThe argument has been made that the marginal deterrent effect on
price fixers and other white collar criminals may remain high only for rather short terms of
imprisonment and then fall off rapidly. In our experience, however, over the last two years
the average term of incarceration has been 18 months, a relatively long sentence, and yet
cartel activity continues to be uncovered.").
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is evidence that current sentencing practices are too relaxed to
sufficiently deter.
Undue leniency in sentencing offenders undermines the deterrent
potential of criminal antitrust statutes. 8 3 Yet examples of undue
leniency abound.l" In the case of the folding-carton cartel in the
mid-1970s, forty-eight executives from twenty-two companies were
convicted of price fixing." 5 Among the convicted defendants, only
one-third were sentenced to prison-with terms ranging from five
to sixty days." 6 Another third were placed on probation and fined
between $500 and $30,000.187 The final third merely received fines
ranging from $100 to $2,500.188 Thus, some individuals were
convicted of criminal price fixing in a multi-million dollar cartel and
the punishment was a $100 fine,'89 hardly a compelling deterrent. 190
Similarly, in the citric acid cartel, the ordinary sentencing
calculation would have led to Hans Hartmann receiving a prison
term of 24 to 30 months and a fine of $350,000.191 Instead, the DOJ
supported substantial leniency.'92 Not only did Hartmann pay less
than half of the standard fine, he received no prison time at all;
indeed, he did not have to pay restitution, receive home detention,
183. See Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 24, at 653-54.
184. See CONNOR, supra note 42, at 561 ('The DOJ has been criticized for giving away too
much when it negotiated guilty pleas for corporate and individual members of global cartels
that were convicted in the late 1990s.").
185. Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, supra note 134, at 155.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See also Baker & Faulkner, supra note 78, at 855-56 (detailing low punishments in
the electrical equipment cartels).
Low sentences were also the hallmark for individuals who pled guilty in the international
vitamin cartel. Although the vitamin cartel led to billions of dollars in illegal overcharges and
every member firm pleaded guilty, the individuals who actually performed the price fixing
over several years cut deals and received relatively short prison sentences, with none serving
more than a year. First, supra note 51, at 717. While one former Vice President of Sales and
Marketing agreed to serve one year and one day, id., the move was purely strategic because
that was the minimum sentence needed to make him eligible for time off for good behavior
before serving his full sentence. Unlike the folding-carton and electrical equipment cartels,
however, these relatively light sentences were probably a function of plea agreements and the
fact that many of the individuals were foreigners who voluntarily submitted to American
jurisdiction.
191. CONNOR, supra note 42, at 388. This case occurred prior to the increase of the
maximum sentence to ten years.
192. Id.
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or even face probation.193 Although the government referred to his
cooperation at the eleventh hour, Hartmann's employer, Bayer, was
the last member of the cartel to settle with the government; thus,
Hartmann provided no information necessary to convict other cartel
members. 194
Indeed, individual employees have sometimes escaped punish-
ment altogether without either cooperating or accepting responsi-
bility. For example, the president of one company convicted of
participating in the electrical equipment cartels denied fixing price
at all, characterizing the company's conduct as an attempt to
"recover costs." '195 Nonetheless, he was still spared any prison time
upon conviction due largely to his age, sixty-eight years old.196 While
sympathy is natural, if the price fixer had wanted leniency, he
should have cooperated with investigators. The sentencing of
antitrust violators, however, shows that cooperation is not a
prerequisite for leniency. Federal judges often grant leniency in
sentencing to convicted price fixers based purely on the defendant's
advanced age, which is generally in the mid-sixties.'97 But price
fixing is not a crime of the young; cartel leaders are often senior
executives, who have sometimes been engaging in price fixing for
decades. If older executives automatically receive a discount upon
conviction, deterrence is necessarily undermined.
A final example of unearned leniency comes from the auction
house price-fixing case, which involved four major participants:
Anthony Tennant and Christopher Davidge from Christie's and
Alfred Taubman and Dede Brooks from Sotheby's. Attorneys
representing Christie's provided significant evidence against their
counterparts at Sotheby's in exchange for immunity from criminal
prosecution. ' Dede Brooks made a separate deal with prosecutors
to testify against her boss, Alfred Taubman, in exchange for
leniency.'99 As the sole conspirator who did not cooperate with
officials and was convicted of felonious price fixing, one would have
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Geis, supra note 83, at 147.
196. Id. His wife's illness played a role as well.
197. See Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 24, at 654.
198. MASON, supra note 1, at 245-47.
199. See Ashenfelter & Graddy, supra note 121, at 10-11.
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expected Taubman to receive a relatively long prison sentence. Yet,
the judge initially sentenced Taubman to only one year in prison
and a $7.5 million fine.200 Taubman's attorney asked for the
sentence to be increased to a year and a day in order to make
Taubman eligible for time off for good behavior, a request that the
judge granted.2"' Thus, Taubman ultimately served less than one
year in prison after being convicted of instigating a cartel that
resulted in millions of dollars of consumer overcharges. If he had
actually confessed to authorities, it is not clear that Taubman, as
the last person in the cartel to confess, could have negotiated a
better plea bargain before trial than the punishment he received
upon conviction after trial. This is a disappointing result; punish-
ment after conviction must be more harsh than cooperation at any
stage. Otherwise, a guilty individual may perceive that she is better
off continuing to deny and obfuscate instead of cooperating with
antitrust officials.
In short, unearned leniency in sentencing price-fixing employees
interferes with the goal of reducing antitrust conspiracies for two
related reasons. First, it sends the wrong message to those consider-
ing cartelization about the seriousness of their crime. Second,
reducing the sentence for reasons unrelated to cooperation with
antitrust authorities decreases deterrence as price fixers discount
the anticipated punishment for their crimes."' The result is that a
cartel's agents may not feel sufficient pressure to be faithless.
One way to increase agents' perceived probability of imprison-
ment is through the judicious use of carve-outs. Under the Antitrust
Division's Corporate Leniency Program, the first eligible firm to
confess to participation in an illegal cartel obtains immunity from
all criminal fines, and its cooperating employees all avoid imprison-
ment.20 3 The later-confessing firms do not necessarily receive such
five-star treatment. Those firms get a reduction in their base fine
depending on their order of confession, but they do not automati-
200. MASON, supra note 1, at 360.
201. Id.
202. Of course, reductions in sentence can be justified by other policy concerns. But judges
should explicitly recognize that unearned leniency reduces deterrence, and that any rationale
for granting leniency must be weighed against the effect it could have on deterring illegal
price fixing.
203. CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 129, at 75.
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cally obtain blanket immunity for their employees." 4 Instead, while
the firms can attempt to negotiate package deals that include
protection for their price-fixing executives, antitrust prosecutors
may require that the later-confessing firms "carve out" some of their
employees from the plea bargain.05 After one cartel member has
already secured amnesty, when the antitrust prosecutors discuss
deals with the other firms,
in the early stages of corporate plea negotiations, the Division
staff will identify a set of executives as potential 'carve-outs'
from the employee nonprosecution and cooperation provisions of
the potential corporate plea agreement. The carve-outs likely
will include culpable individuals to whom the Division is ready
to send a target letter, implicated individuals against whom the
Division is still developing evidence, and individuals knowledge-
able about the cartel who refuse to cooperate in the Division's
investigation. The Division typically insists that these individu-
als obtain separate counsel, and those individuals will be given
the opportunity to proffer their cooperation to the government
and asked if they can implicate higher-level corporate officials.
Depending on their willingness to cooperate, their level of
culpability, and their position in the company, some of the
potential carve-outs may be able to negotiate immunity deals or
favorable plea agreements.2°
Carved-out employees must negotiate separately with prosecutors
and often "the individuals should understand that any subsequent
plea disposition with the Division would have to include a jail
component. If no deal can be reached, then the individuals will be
indicted."2 °7 Absent an acceptable plea bargain, they face being
prosecuted with the evidence provided by their own employer as
well as all of the other cartel members who confessed, as happened
to individuals in the sorbates cartel.208 Carved-out employees often
204. See id. The second confessing firm receives a greater discount off its base fine than the
third confessing firm; the third confessing firm receives a greater discount than the fourth
confessing firm, and so on.
205. Id. at 87-88.
206. Id. at 88.
207. Hammond, supra note 107, at 337.
208. See id. at 335-36.
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serve jail time. °9 For example, in the case of the international vita-
min cartel, because Rh6ne-Poulenc confessed first, it earned full
amnesty from American criminal prosecution for both the corpora-
tion and all of its officers, directors, and employees in the United
States and abroad.21 ° Because Rh6ne-Poulenc's co-conspirators
Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF failed to confess first, each had to
carve out four employees, most of whom submitted to U.S. jurisdic-
tion (despite being foreign nationals) and served prison time in
America, as well as paid large criminal fines.21'
Antitrust policy should maximize each cartel agent's fear that its
employer will work out an amnesty deal that has a carve-out
provision. Anxiety over being carved out may cause an otherwise
faithful agent to expose a cartel quickly. Any employee who worries
that his firm will not confess first and that he will be sacrificed is
better off confessing immediately as an individual. The threat of
being carved out has proven a powerful motivator for cartel agents
in the past: Davidge's concern about being carved out led him to
reveal his cache of notes documenting the auction house cartel.2"2 In
addition to helping expose cartels, the carve-out threat could also
provide a significant disincentive for workers to accept jobs at firms
that have reputations for engaging in price fixing. This could put
another burden on price-fixing firms by making them less efficient
in the long run as more capable executives go to law-abiding firms.
A proper carve-out policy can align the principal and agent's
interests in confessing participation in illegal price fixing.2"3
Recognizing its agents' incentives to confess as individuals, each
firm has greater reason to confess sooner as a corporate act in order
to get the best deal possible and, if it confesses first, to avoid
criminal liability altogether. Firms that fear that someone else will
expose the cartel may also want to confess first and prevent any
employee carve-outs because carving out individuals also hurts the
firm, as its executives or other employees are indicted as criminals.
In the case of foreign firms, their key employees may not be able to
209. See id. at 338 (discussing graphite electrode cartel).
210. Id. at 339.
211. Id.
212. See MASON, supra note 1, at 243.
213. See CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 129, at 88.
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enter the United States or travel freely elsewhere.214 After being
carved out of their firm's cooperation agreements with the Antitrust
Division, several executives of Japanese chemical companies, who
engaged in fixing prices of food preservatives, were considered
international fugitives by the U.S. government, meaning "they could
be arrested, detained, extradited to the United States, and held for
trial if they travel[ed] to or through any one of a host of countries
with which the United States has an extradition treaty covering
antitrust crimes. 215
In order to maximize the incentives for firms and employees to
confess, the carve-out policy should be employed to insure that
some participants in every exposed cartel serve time in prison.
Unfortunately, evidence suggests that the Antitrust Division may
be undermining its own program by not always aggressively
prosecuting those executives who have been carved out.2 1' Even
after firms have pleaded guilty to price fixing-and successful
conviction of the individual participants is virtually assured-the
Division has entered into individual plea agreements, with prison
sentences for carved-out individuals of just four to six months.2"'
Indeed, in some past instances, in order to obtain insider testimony,
every individual who participated in a cartel was given immunity
from criminal prosecution.2"8 That is a mistake: Somebody should be
left holding the bag because the threat of being that person will
motivate cartel agents to defect more quickly. The emphasis in
current enforcement efforts appears to be on securing large criminal
fines against price-fixing corporations instead of meaningful prison
sentences against the individuals who actually engage in fixing
price, which undermines deterrence of individual participation in
price-fixing conspiracies.2 9
Making lengthy prison terms the norm for carved-out executives
would enhance deterrence of price fixing. Of course, there should be
no mandatory carve outs for the first firm to confess; thus, once
214. See Hammond, supra note 107, at 336.
215. Id. at 335-36.
216. See Summary of Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing on Criminal Remedies
2-3 (Nov. 3, 2005) (comments of Tefft W. Smith), available at http://www.atanet.org/antitrust/
at-links/pdf/at-mod/criminal-remedies.pdf [hereinafter AMC Hearing].
217. See id. at 9-10.
218. See Werden & Simon, supra note 149, at 931-32.
219. See AMC Hearing, supra note 216.
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exposure of the cartel seems likely, everyone within each member
firm shares the same incentive to confess first. But mandatory
carve-outs for some individuals at all other firms within the cartel
would create a powerful incentive for agents to be faithless. Cartel
managers would be less likely to risk that their firm will not confess
first and that they will be carved out from any deals if the certainty
of imprisonment for carved-out individuals were greater. Our
antitrust enforcement regime needs to make prison a more mean-
ingful threat-longer sentences and greater certainty of prison for
those who do not confess first.220
In sum, the threat of a long prison sentence for employees who
engage in price fixing can destabilize cartels because it decouples
the interests of the price-fixing firms from those of their employees.
While a cartel member firm can compensate its agents for financial
penalties, the firm cannot generally make its employees whole if
they are sent to prison. Price fixers value their freedom more than
their money, as shown by the fact that antitrust defendants
frequently request "to pay substantial fines in lieu of receiving a jail
term" but "[n]ever has an antitrust target in the U.S. offered to go
to jail in lieu of paying a fine." '221 But for the prison threat to
properly deter illegal price fixing, cartel agents must perceive a
certainty of imprisonment upon detection.222
B. Rewarding the Faithless Agent
Cartel agents participate in price fixing in part because they
believe that the costs of defection are high.2 3 In order to counterbal-
ance this perception, antitrust law should provide offsetting bene-
fits to negate these costs. Antitrust authorities must give sufficient
incentive for employees with evidence of price fixing to step
forward---confidentially if necessary-and provide information to
prosecutors. This Section discusses three possible rewards: freedom
220. See id. at 11 ('There should be certainty that the right people will be persistently
prosecuted and sent to jail.").
221. CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 100.
222. See Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies To Deter and Punish Cartels
and Bid-rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 693, 706 (2001).
223. See supra Part II.E.
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from criminal prosecution; freedom from private civil liability; and
antitrust bounties.
1. Individual Leniency Program
Fear of prison is a large motivating factor in how individuals
transact cartel business. They seek to conceal cartel operations by
using code names, having clandestine meetings, and destroying any
paper trail.224 This same fear of imprisonment can be transformed
into a carrot if early confessors are rewarded with a get-out-of-jail-
free card. The Antitrust Division has sought to do this through its
Individual Leniency Program.225
In addition to its Corporate Leniency Program, the Antitrust
Division maintains a parallel program for individuals.226 Under the
Leniency Policy for Individuals, an individual cartel participant can
secure automatic amnesty so long as he is the first source to expose
the cartel, cooperates fully with the government investigation, was
not the cartel leader, and has not coerced others into fixing price.227
The Individual Leniency Policy has been seldom used, especially in
comparison to the Corporate Leniency Program.2 ' That is surpris-
ing given that individual employees have more to lose by not
cooperating than does a corporation. One reason why we see little
use of the Individual Leniency Policy may be that an individual
agent may simply convince her employer to confess on a firm-wide
basis, which grants protection to all individuals within the first-
confessing firm.229 That would explain the behavior of agents in
224. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
225. See CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 31.
226. ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS (1994),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.pdf.
227. See Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 35, at 466 (criticizing these limitations as
applied to the Corporate Leniency Program and advocating amnesty for the first confessor
without restriction).
228. See AMC Hearing, supra note 216, at 3.
229. If a corporation qualifies for amnesty, individuals who come forward with the firm also
will receive amnesty. If a corporation does not qualify for amnesty, individuals within the firm
who come forward will be considered for immunity as if they had approached the Division
individually. See CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 31; see also Buccirossi & Spagnolo,
supra note 71, at 19 ("Individual applications are never observed, but this does not imply that
individual leniency is ineffective. It is not directly used, but it is a credible threat in the hands
of individual whistleblowers that pushes corporations to apply for corporate leniency before
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those firms that do in fact seek amnesty under the Antitrust
Division's corporate program. But for many cartels, no member firm
seeks amnesty; cartels exist undetected and unexposed. Why do
individuals in those cartels not confess? It must be because they do
not believe that the benefits of confession outweigh the costs of
detection. 230 Antitrust policy should be structured to alter these
perceptions.
Cartels collapse when insiders compete to confess first. The
Corporate Leniency Guidelines already create a race to confess
among firms, with the winner receiving amnesty.23' In addition to
the cartel-wide race, antitrust authorities should generate a race
within each firm. Antitrust policymakers could consider exempting
from imprisonment the first individual from each firm who con-
fesses to participating in the cartel, if she presents evidence against
other price fixers within her firm.232 This would create an ex ante
incentive for employees to keep clandestine files on cartel activity
so that they can offer meaningful assistance to authorities when the
hammer falls or when they fear that the cartel is about to be
discovered. And this individual amnesty should be available even
after other corporations in the cartel have cooperated with the
government and have secured amnesty.2"3 This change would give
individual conspirators within each firm a significant incentive to
distrust each other, just as the corporate amnesty program gives
each firm an incentive to distrust its cartel partners.234 Recent
its managers apply individually.").
230. This refers to the costs of detection discounted by the probability of detection.
231. See Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 35, at 457.
232. However, individuals should not be required to have evidence on hand when they
actually confess; a requirement of immediately available evidence would decelerate the race
to the prosecutor's office. Instead, individual confessors should be able to lay down a "marker."
For corporate confessors,
the [Antitrust] Division has adopted a policy that allows a company to secure its
place at the front of the line by reporting the criminal conduct and putting down
a "marker." The company will then be given a certain period of time to complete
its internal investigation, report its findings to the Division, and perfect its
amnesty application.
Hammond, supra note 107, at 329.
233. Thus, even though an employee's firm is no longer eligible for amnesty, the employee
could still receive amnesty as an individual.
234. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 35, at 478-79.
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experience with corporate leniency shows that this form of distrust
leads to confessions.235
The downside of this approach is that it may encourage an
individual employee to wait and see if another cartel member-
either a firm or an individual at another firm-confesses before he
confesses. If the employee only has to beat his co-workers in the race
to get amnesty, he can run more slowly than he would if he were
racing to beat every individual participant from all of the cartel
member firms. This could help stabilize the cartel by providing a
brake on fast confessions. If so, this suggests a minor tweak: the
first individual employee to expose the cartel to the government
should receive complete amnesty while the first employee from each
price-fixing firm who confesses would receive a substantial reduc-
tion in all penalties, including prison time. Thus, the individual
employee would not only have a strong incentive to be the very first
confessor in the whole cartel, but also-if he loses that race to be
first-still retains a significant incentive to be the first confessor
from his own firm.
2. Private Liability
Some individuals may cooperate in cartel efforts to conceal price-
fixing activity because they fear being held personally liable in
private treble-damage actions. Indeed, because antitrust provides
joint and several liability with no right to contribution,26 an
individual could theoretically be on the hook for all of the over-
charges imposed by the entire cartel, trebled.237 To the extent that
the threat of private civil liability represents a disincentive to
cooperate with federal authorities, the first employee from each firm
who confesses should receive immunity from private antitrust suits.
Injured consumers could still receive full compensation, but all
damages would be paid by those firms or individuals who confess too
late or not at all.
235. See id. at 480.
236. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40 (1981).
237. This seems unlikely given that most plaintiffs would set their sights on deeper
pockets-the firms.
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3. Antitrust Bounties
Finally, if an economic incentive persuades employees to partici-
pate in price fixing, it makes sense that an economic lever could
sway them to expose cartel activity. Perhaps the most direct way to
reward faithless agents would be to pay them to expose price fixing.
Paying antitrust bounties could encourage insiders to approach
antitrust prosecutors with evidence.23 It might seem unfair that one
participant in an illegal scheme could ultimately be rewarded for
her insider knowledge, but in rejecting the in pari delicto defense in
antitrust cases, the Supreme Court has reasoned that:
[T]he purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring
that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter
anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the
antitrust laws. The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble
damages may be no less morally reprehensible than the defen-
dant, but the law encourages his suit to further the overriding
public policy in favor of competition.239
Under this logic, it is no less unreasonable to reward the individual
cartel participant who exposes the cartel.
Antitrust bounties can destabilize cartels in three related ways.
First, individuals motivated by greed may be enticed to reveal the
cartel. Second, even the less greedy have a compelling motive to
defect: knowing that others have a financial incentive to confess
gives each individual a strong reason not to trust her fellow cartel
operatives. Thus, even loyal cartel workers might take the bait
-albeit purely as a defensive move in anticipation of others being
lured by the bounty. Third, antitrust bounties give employees a
strong incentive to collect evidence documenting the cartel, which
the employee can disclose in exchange for cash.24°
238. See William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying
Informants To Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 766, 792-97 (2001).
239. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Intl Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
240. In extreme cases, the bounty allows employees during salary or severance negotiations
to threaten cartel exposure, in which case the bounty would provide the floor on the price of
silence. Aubert et al., supra note 123, at 34 ("Individuals may also want to keep evidence of
collusion because of agency problems within the firm, particularly between the owner(s), the
manager and the involved employee(s). Antitrust reward programs can exacerbate, or even
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Antitrust bounties should be generous. Without a sufficient
incentive, few employees will be willing to sacrifice their jobs,
professional friendships, and standing in the community24' by
cooperating with federal antitrust agencies in exposing and
prosecuting cartel activity. When one brings down an industry-wide
cartel, few firms in that industry (especially those who participated
in the cartel) would be likely to embrace the confessor as a new
employee. If so, the value of the confessor's industry-specific work
experience could plummet. In short, the costs of confession are high,
even when confession insulates the employee from criminal and civil
liability. The rewards should be at least as great.
All of these measures-immunity from criminal prosecution and
civil liability, and the payment of antitrust bounties-should help
decouple the interests of a cartel's principals and its agents. These
interests seem aligned because both want to conceal the cartel in
order to avoid punishment. Additionally, both the principal and
agent currently maximize their expected profits by engaging in price
fixing. But with an appropriate mix of carrots and sticks, the
individual can maximize her utility by being faithless-exposing the
cartel to avert imprisonment and earn cash.242
C. Rewarding Disloyal Principals
Most discussions of agency relationships focus on the duties that
the agent owes to the principal. But almost every principal also
owes duties to its agents, generally including salary, benefits, and
often procedural protections. In the context of cartel firm relation-
ships, the principal's duties to its agents are more nuanced and
rarely written down. Each firm's internal cartel leader promises,
create such agency problems. The employee that negotiates or implements the cartel
agreement may want to keep evidence in order to increase his bargaining power vis-A-vis the
manager or the shareholders, and obtain a pay raise....').
241. Whitacre became a pariah after his role in exposing the lysine cartel became known.
LIEBER, supra note 52, at 11.
242. Aubert et al., supra note 123, at 36 ("Bounties can also create or exacerbate agency
problems between owners and employees. Individuals are indeed given incentives to keep
hard information, making it more likely that the antitrust authority will find evidence of
collusion, and increasing the cost of collusion by the amount that firms have to pay to prevent
their employees from reporting evidence.").
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either explicitly or implicitly, that it will reward that firm's price-
fixing employees for their loyalty, competence, and discretion. These
rewards are primarily financial but also include the promise not to
betray the employees' loyalty.
An agent is more likely to be faithless if he fears that his
principal does not have his back. For example, the distrust between
Christie's and Davidge, especially after Davidge resigned his
position at Christie's, played a major role in Davidge's decision
making.243 Both Christie's and Davidge were worried about being
the fall guy.244 The auction house price-fixing case also shows how
the antitrust leniency guidelines worked to create a strong incentive
to confess first. After Christie's received Davidge's handwritten
notes that laid out the antitrust conspiracy, Christie's had a strong
incentive to make a deal with the American prosecutors before
Davidge did. Furthermore, since Davidge had just left Christie's, the
executives at Christie's were worried that Sotheby's executives
might fear that Davidge would expose the conspiracy and Sotheby's
could attempt to secure amnesty from the antitrust prosecutors by
turning in Christie's for its role in the price-fixing conspiracy.245
Davidge's distrust of Christie's started this cartel-exposing chain of
events.
Antitrust authorities should implement policies that make
individual employees who participate in cartel activity distrust their
employers. For example, authorities should reward firms that
confess to cartel participation if they turn in their employees who
participated in the price fixing. Currently, under the Sentencing
Guidelines for corporate defendants in criminal antitrust cases,
"substantial assistance downward departure motions reward
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another organiza-
tion or an individual 'not directly affiliated with the defendant.'
Thus, a company cannot obtain a substantial assistance downward
departure for evidence it provides against its own employees. 246
243. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
244. See MASON, supra note 1, at 240-41.
245. See id. at 246.
246. CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 129, at 80 (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C4.1(a) (2005)). But see Memorandum from Eric H. Holder,
Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys,
Bringing Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) ("In gauging the extent of the
corporation's cooperation, the prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness to identify
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That is shortsighted because it gives a corporate defendant insuffi-
cient incentive to turn on its own employees. And, thus, the
individual agents have insufficient reason to distrust their bosses
and to confess as a preemptive move. A firm should earn a down-
ward departure for turning in-and cooperating in prosecutions
of-its own employees because this would make the agent distrust
the principal, a key component in converting a loyal lieutenant into
a faithless agent. With such incentives for corporations in place,
antitrust authorities could attempt to convince lower-level employ-
ees that any firm caught fixing price would try to reduce its own
monetary exposure rather than protect its individual employees.247
This could create cartel-destabilizing agency costs: "If the company
is more concerned about the financial consequences of a decision to
self report than it is about the fate of its executives with culpability,
then the interests of the company and those individuals are almost
assuredly in conflict. 248
If cartel agents fear that their bosses may turn them in, prudent
agents will take precautionary actions. At a minimum, distrust
could encourage employees to make and maintain records in
violation of cartel rules. Taking their cue from Christopher Davidge
at Christie's, they may realize that creating evidence of cartel
activity is their best insurance policy against being hung out to dry.
Once such records are created, an employee may be tempted to
share them with the government in exchange for leniency on price-
fixing charges or even another unrelated crime. Also, such notes
may be inadvertently discovered and lead to the exposure and
downfall of a cartel, as happened with the international uranium
cartel249 and the plumbing fixtures cartel.
250
Providing incentives for each price-fixing firm to sell out its own
employees has two potential cartel-destabilizing effects. First, the
firm may accept the offer and expose the cartel. Second, and most
the culprits within the corporation, including senior executives, to make witnesses available,
to disclose the complete results of its internal investigation, and to waive the attorney-client
and work product privileges.").
247. See GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 128, at 17 ('Unfortunately, the reduction
in the corporate fine will not insulate executives and employees of the company from potential
prosecution.").
248. Hammond, supra note 107, at 339.
249. See SPAR, supra note 53, at 88-91.
250. See Mills & Elzinga, supra note 116, at 940 n.5.
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relevant for our purposes, when agents realize that their interests
are not necessarily aligned with those of their employers, they may
reconsider whether it is in their long-term best interest to continue
cartel business and concealment as usual, since the only guarantee
of no prison time would come from confessing first as an individual.
D. Educating the Agents
Decoupling the interests of a principal and its agent is unlikely to
create a faithless agent unless the agent appreciates the divergence
of interests. Increasing the costs of participating in price fixing,
while offering meaningful rewards for exposure, would be a hollow
policy if the targets of these efforts were unaware of them and thus
unable to determine their own best interests. Antitrust policy
should seek to inform cartel participants about the advantages of
defection. Unfortunately, any such education efforts would not take
place on a blank slate because successful cartels have developed
social norms that encourage price fixing and concealing the cartel
activity. This Section explains the importance of anticompetitive
social norms, why antitrust education is important, what it should
include, and how to spread the message.
1. Antitrust Education and Overcoming Social Norms Within
Cartels
One of the most effective ways to mold behavior is through the
construction of social norms.251 Richard McAdams has defined social
norms as "informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated
to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear
of external non-legal sanctions, or both."'252 One of the great issues
in any community is how to form social norms of cooperative
behavior. Of course, not all such social norms are desirable. After
251. See JOHN EISTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 101 (1989)
("[S]ocial norms differ from legal norms. For one thing, obedience to the law is often rational
on purely outcome-oriented grounds."); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 903, 967 (1996) ('Many of the most severe problems in current societies are
a product of unfortunate norms, meanings, and roles.").
252. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 338, 340 (1997).
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all, there is honor among thieves. More importantly for antitrust
concerns, social norms can prevent competition.253
Attempts to educate cartel agents about antitrust policy may be
complicated by the fact that anticompetitive norms pervade many
industries in the United States. Price-fixing cartels develop strong
social norms against competition and in favor of creating and
concealing cartels. A social norm of price fixing can also exist within
a given corporation. For example, in the electrical equipment
cartels, subordinates and middle managers at Westinghouse and
General Electric learned price-fixing behavior by watching their
immediate superiors fix prices.254 This taught the executives how to
fix prices and fostered the belief that price fixing was encouraged,
a way of life. Indeed, to refuse to participate in the conspiracy would
result in expulsion from the group. Just as children sometimes take
on the beliefs of their parents, executives raised in this price-fixing
milieu operated as though price fixing were moral and natural when
they themselves reached positions of power.255
More dangerously, social norms against competition can pervade
entire industries. Social norms for collusion can be intrinsic in
some markets that have never known true competition, as in the
case of the early twentieth century electric lamp industry.256 In
some commodity markets, such as that for magnesium, cartels
"cultivat[ed] a philosophy of restrictionism." '257 Similarly, the rayon
industry had a "culture of collusion" among firms that eschewed
competition.258 Such industry norms predate the Industrial
Revolution: for example, in the 1840s Kanawha salt cartel, social
253. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 187 (1995) (showing examples of the fear of ostracization preventing companies
from hiring the employees of other companies).
254. See Geis, supra note 83, at 146.
255. Faulkner et al., supra note 73, at 513 ("The internal organizational culture of the
price-fixing firms plays an important role since the stance towards ethical conduct and
compliance by top management of firms affects middle and lower management." (citation
omitted)).
256. See STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 40, at 304 ("Although the industry was nearly
a half century old when the cartel was born, the business had developed from the outset on
a monopolistic rather than a competitive pattern. The cartel was the culmination, not the
inauguration, of a program to avoid competition in the manufacture and sale of electric
lamps.").
257. Id. at 303.
258. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 21, at 69 (citation omitted).
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norms were created to ostracize any salt producer who would violate
the cartel's rules.
If a member willfully and voluntarily contravened the articles,
resolution, or pledge of the association, two-thirds of the
members at a stated meeting could expel him after previously
informing him of the causes. It "shall be duty of each member to
withhold all offices of good neighborhood and kindness, and to
decline all business intercourse with each expelled member, so
far as those offices and such business intercourse may directly
or indirectly aid him in making, vending or shipping salt."
Members also agreed to shun persons who might aid the
expelled member in the salt trade until the violator made
restitution for his wrongdoing and agreed to abide by the
regulations of the association.259
In addition to the moral obligation of shunning defectors, every
cartel member had a duty to report all transgressors to the so-called
"committee of vigilance," which enforced the cartel's dictates.26 °
While price fixing was not criminal during the life of the
Kanawha salt cartel, even today strong social norms favoring price
fixing can trump laws criminalizing such collusion. Even though
price fixing is a felony, "a cartel constitutes a 'moral community' to
the extent that 'trustworthy behavior can be expected, normative
standards understood, and opportunism foregone.""'26 In some
industries, there has at times been an unquestioned expectation
that all firms will violate the antitrust laws. For example, one
particularly high-ranking defendant in the electrical equipment
cartel criminal cases opined: "No one attending the gatherings was
so stupid that he didn't know the meetings were in violation of the
law. But it is the only way a business can be run. It is free enter-
prise." '262 A social norm that belittles antitrust principles can become
so pervasive that executives may fail to give any weight to the fact
259. JOHN E. STEALEY III, THE ANTEBELLUM KANAWHA SALT BUSINESS AND WESTERN
MARKETS 160-61 (1993).
260. Id. at 159.
261. Joel M. Podolny & Fiona M. Scott Morton, Social Status, Entry and Predation: The
Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929, 47 J. INDus. ECON. 41, 44-45 (1999).
262. FULLER, supra note 142, at 91.
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that antitrust violations are illegal.263 Secretly recorded conversa-
tions and testimony after cartel discovery-including in the lysine,
citric acid, and vitamin cartels-all show that the executives and
the lower-level employees carrying out cartel operations all know
that they are breaking the law.2 64 ADM's internal corporate motto,
which it shared with its cartel partners, was, "The competitor is our
friend and the customer is our enemy.""26
For decades, antitrust law did precious little to undermine these
anticompetitive norms. Firms found engaging in price fixing were
generally handled with kid gloves. Until 1959, criminal fines in
antitrust cases "were modest and paid cheerfully by companies as
a 'minor cost of doing business.' Corporate antitrust convictions
were the equivalent of corporate parking tickets. 266 After 1959,
prison became a possibility, but the likelihood was still remote.
Unearned leniency and generous plea agreements simply reinforced
the perception among many cartel managers that price fixing was
only nominally criminal.
Antitrust officials should seek to develop and nurture counter-
norms, norms that encourage respect for competition and treat the
exposure of criminal price fixing as a noble course of action. Of
course, to create norms based on the nobility of confession, insiders
who cooperate with the government should not be referred to as
faithless agents. While this nomenclature is accurate for purposes
of academic analysis, it is not necessarily a label that those unfa-
miliar with the literature would readily embrace. The better note to
strike in educating employees about the illegality of price fixing
and the benefits of confession would emphasize the pride of obeying
the law. In their study of the folding-carton cartel, Professors
Sonnenfeld and Lawrence noted that "[t]he most critical factor in
preventing collusion is that managements unambiguously foster the
kind of professional pride that is repulsed by any form of illegal
profits. 267 When there is a social norm of competition, it is harder
to create and maintain a stable cartel. For example, the interna-
tional uranium cartel suffered mightily from a social norm of
263. Id. at 170.
264. See CONNOR, supra note 42, at 11-12.
265. LIEBER, supra note 52, at 10.
266. CONNOR, supra note 42, at 43 (quoting HERLING, supra note 85).
267. Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, supra note 134, at 145.
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competition among its Canadian members. 28 The following Section
discusses how antitrust officials might try to overcome the prevail-
ing anticompetitive social norm in some industries.
2. Education as a Decoupling Device
If employees of price-fixing firms better understood the risks they
are taking, their employers' incentives to abandon them, and their
ability to exit the illegal cartel with minimal costs, more individuals
might conclude that their best option is to decline to participate or
to decide to expose the cartel. To maximize the probability of agent
faithlessness, individuals should understand the following.
a. Penalties
The penalties for criminal price fixing are relatively high. The
maximum prison term is now ten years.26 In addition, although the
text of the Sherman Act appears to cap criminal fines at $1 million
for individuals,27 ° that appearance is deceptive. Because price fixing
is a crime, those convicted are subject to pay either double-the-
gain or double-the-loss associated with the violation. While this
method of calculating fines has been used primarily against cor-
porations,272 it can also be employed against individuals.273 Potential
individual antitrust violators need to be made aware that the
maximum fine in many cases is essentially defined by the individ-
ual's total wealth. In sum, individuals must understand both the
scope and consequences of violating a criminal law in order to be
deterred by it.274
268. See SPAR, supra note 53, at 134 ("[M]ost of the Canadian companies joined the
government's program only under duress, and even during the operation of the cartel, they
continued to distrust one another and even to sign secret, separate contracts with their
preferred customers.").
269. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
270. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
271. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2006).
272. See LIEBER, supra note 52, at 115-16.
273. For example, Alfred Taubman was fined $7.5 million. MASON, supra note 1, at 360.
274. See Katyal, supra note 136, at 1333-34 (explaining that in some circumstances,
deterrence "will depend on the assumption that criminals know the contours of conspiracy
law").
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b. Firms'Incentives To Sell Out Employees
Cartel agents often harbor attitudes of "we're all in this together."
The conspiracy as a happy family is a romantic notion of which
individuals need to be disabused. Instead, individuals should be
made aware of how some price-fixing firms treat their loyal
employees once the cartel is exposed. In the electrical equipment
cartels, for example, General Electric unceremoniously terminated
its lower-level employees who had been indicted.27 Because high-
level executives instigated the price fixing and pressured employees
to participate or be fired, when GE publicly chastised its salesmen
for violating both antitrust law and the company's stated policy
against price fixing, GE's actions were "interpreted as an attempt
to scapegoat particular individuals for what was essentially the
responsibility of the corporate enterprise and its top executives.""27
At subsequent Senate hearings on the cartel, terminated GE
employees concurred in the assessment that they had been "thrown
to the wolves to ease the public relations situation." '277 More
recently, an ADM executive warned one of its operatives in the citric
acid cartel that "[i]f ever any of this goes wrong, you are on your
own," which the subordinate took "to mean that ADM would try to
distance itself from him if the scam were exposed."278
Additionally, individual employees should understand the
possibility of being carved out from criminal immunity if another
firm exposes the cartel first. The carve-out policy means that even
if the firm wanted to protect its employees by negotiating an
omnibus deal, it could not do so if the government insisted on
carving out certain individuals.279 The destabilizing effect of this
policy could be further magnified if employees knew that every
price-fixing firm negotiating a settlement with the Antitrust
Division would be offered payments for each cartel agent that it
carved out. If employees understood that their interests diverge
significantly from their employers', they would be less willing to risk
275. See Geis, supra note 83, at 146.
276. Id.
277. Id. (quoting Senator John A. Carroll).
278. LIEBER, supra note 52, at 189.
279. See supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
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being used as bargaining chips and more likely to strike their own
deals earlier.
c. Individual Leniency Policy
Although many major corporations seem to be appropriately well
versed on the Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Policy, those
people actually managing cartel operations do not appear informed
about the corresponding Individual Leniency Policy. In many
cartels, individual participants apparently fail to appreciate the
advantages of confessing immediately as an individual, especially
when a government investigation appears on the horizon. For
example, concerned that the government's longstanding suspicions
of antitrust violations in the auction industry were about to be
confirmed, the CEO of Sotheby's, Dede Brooks, asked her firm for
permission to negotiate a deal for herself.8 ° By the time she
received permission and approached the antitrust prosecutors, the
opportunity for automatic amnesty had expired. Davidge and
Christie's had already made a deal.2"' Employees like Brooks need
to be aware that in many cases confession is not a team sport; it is
an individual event. Faithful employees who attempt to reconcile
their positions with their employers' may find themselves regretting
their loyalty after it is too late. Educating them beforehand can
allow individuals to make decisions in their own interests, including
either declining to participate in price fixing in the first place or
exposing the cartel.
d. Probability of Detection
Criminal sanctions against individuals caught fixing prices,
combined with leniency and monetary rewards for cooperating
individuals, should decouple the interests of the firm and its
employees.282 However, even with high punishments for the
convicted and rewards for the confessors, individuals may neverthe-
less conclude that price fixing is net beneficial so long as they
280. See MASON, supra note 1, at 283, 288-89, 298-99.
281. See id. at 283.
282. See CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 49, at 18.
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believe that they will not be caught." 3 This is an important caveat
because most employees who participate in price fixing think that
they will escape detection and never be held accountable.284
There are at least two responses to this problem. First, antitrust
law should make the expected length of imprisonment upon
conviction very high. This should compensate for the perceived low
probability of detection and conviction. Second, the law should
change the agents' perceptions about the near-term probability of
cartel detection. When a cartel's exposure is perceived as imminent,
confession by employees of cartel member firms is rational. If an
individual thinks that the cartel is coming to an end, and that her
employer is not going to confess first, the only way that she would
be guaranteed no prison time would be to confess first as an
individual.285 If the end of the cartel is perceived as near, the
interests of the price-fixing firm and its cartel-participating
employees can become antagonistic.
Antitrust authorities should try to convince employees that that
day is fast approaching. Prosecutors can do this by openly investi-
gating alleged price fixing, empanelling grand juries, and issuing
subpoenas. This creates many opportunities to destabilize a cartel.
First, some cartel agents may be unwilling to perjure themselves;
they would expose the cartel under questioning. Second, knowing
this, other individuals-who would otherwise be loyal agents-will
not want to risk being the sucker and will expose the cartel as a
defensive move.286 Third, if an employee does lie to investigators or
the grand juries and that lie is discovered, then investigators
can nullify any deals made with that witness 287 and charge the
283. See Dean Harvey, Anticompetitive Social Norms as Antitrust Violations, 94 CAL. L.
REv. 769, 778 (2006) ("[M]embers of a cartel must place a sufficiently low probability on being
caught and assign a sufficiently low cost to being caught." (citing DENNIS W. CARLTON &
JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 131 (4th ed. 2005))).
284. See Geis, supra note 83, at 143 ("Like most reasonably adept and optimistic criminals,
the antitrust violators had hoped to escape apprehension. 'I didn't expect to get caught,' ... one
of them said." (citing Administered Prices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 27-28 (1961))).
285. See supra Part III.B.1.
286. That is why it is important to grant amnesty to the first confessor even if the
government has begun its investigation. See Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, supra note 35, at 481-
85.
287. Howard E. O'Leary, Jr., Criminal Antitrust and the Corporate Executive: The Man in
the Middle, 63 A.B.A. J. 1389, 1391 (1977) ("Witnesses also have been prosecuted successfully
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individual with obstruction; that provides independent leverage over
the suspect that can be harnessed to secure a full confession of
cartel activities. From Richard Nixon to Martha Stewart, we see
repeatedly that often it is not the crime but the attempts to cover it
up that lead to the downfall.
The ultimate effect of convincing individuals that the game is not
worth the candle is two-fold. First, more individuals will be faithless
to the cartel and expose it in exchange for immunity from criminal
charges, freedom from private liability, and an appropriate bounty.
Second, deterrence is enhanced. Perceiving a negative expected
value from price fixing, rational workers will refuse to become the
agents of price-fixing principals. Of course, this assumes that the
individuals appreciate the relative costs and benefits. An effective
antitrust program should insure that individuals have a healthy
fear of detection.
3. How To Educate Agents
The Antitrust Division has done an excellent job of explaining its
Amnesty Program to lawyers, through means such as continuing
legal education programs.2" Unfortunately, most executives and
employees engaging in cartel conduct do not confess their price
fixing to their attorneys; indeed, they often assiduously avoid their
own lawyers.289 This means the agents are often unaware of the
legal landscape with respect to amnesty and the risks of not
confessing first. This Section discusses four possible venues for
educating price-fixing employees.
a. Antitrust Compliance Programs
Most major corporations have antitrust compliance programs.29
Antitrust compliance programs typically provide a basic overview of
for perjury after a grant of immunity.").
288. See Gary R. Spratling, Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse: The
Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Policy-An Update, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2001,
at 343, 345 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1248, 2001)
[hereinafter Spratling, Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse].
289. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 1, at 222 (discussing Dede Brooks lying to Sotheby's
outside counsel).
290. See Chavez, supra note 174, at 811.
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antitrust law, advice on how to avoid violations, and a statement of
the company's policy to abide by the law.29' Such programs generally
include the dissemination of compliance manuals, presentations to
employees, and sometimes technology-based programs, as well as
mechanisms for an employee to report antitrust violations to
corporate counsel or to discuss concerns.292
Firms have several reasons to implement antitrust compliance
programs. Ideally, such a program can prevent violations and limit
the company's exposure to criminal and civil liability. But even if
antitrust violations occur within the firm, the corporate defendant
obtains significant benefits from maintaining an antitrust compli-
ance program. First, because criminal price fixing requires a
showing of intent, defendant firms sometimes argue that their
antitrust compliance program demonstrates either a lack of scienter
or lack of proof that their employees engaged in unauthorized
conduct.29 Although far from universal, a few "district courts have
instructed juries that they could consider [antitrust] compliance
programs in determining a corporation's intent." '294 Second, firms
charged with price fixing may invoke their compliance programs in
an attempt to persuade antitrust officials not to prosecute or to
exercise leniency.295 Third, corporate antitrust defendants can
receive reductions in sentencing for having an effective compliance
program in place.296
291. CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 129, at 305 n.189.
292. See Andre R. Jaglom, Managing Distribution: How To Develop a Corporate Legal
Compliance Program, in ALI-ABA PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING 1079, 1087 (2006).
293. See CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, supra note 129, at 305 ("When a corporation is
charged with a criminal violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, proof of the violation will
typically involve imputing the conduct of corporate agents and employees to the corporation
itself.").
294. Id. at 306 n.190.
295. See ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 129 ("Even if litigation is not entirely
avoided by a compliance program, the existence of a real, substantial compliance program,
administered without 'winks,' can constitute exculpatory evidence. Such a program might
persuade government investigators not to prosecute or a judge or jury not to convict or find
liability."); Jaglom, supra note 292, at 1083 (citing Garrett's, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 412 F.
Supp. 656 (D.S.C. 1976)); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Corporate Compliance Ethics and
Malpractice Prevention, in 45TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTING AND
MARKETING 1387, 1389 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8497, 2006).
296. ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 129; Spratling, The Experience and Views
of the Antitrust Division, supra note 32 ("An effective compliance program can reduce an
organization's culpability score by 3 points and, hence, correspondingly reduce its criminal
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While antitrust compliance programs sometimes do help firms
detect price fixing within their organization and apply for am-
nesty,297 many recent international cartel cases speak to how such
programs routinely fail.298 The auction house cartel illustrates the
dubious value of many antitrust compliance programs. After its
board meeting in 1996, Christie's circulated its antitrust policy,
which required employees "to strictly avoid any communications
with a competitor regarding prices and pricing policies, terms or
conditions of sale, profits, margins or costs and bidding for particu-
lar consignments," and to report suspected violations.299 The com-
pany's American employees who strongly believed that Davidge and
Brooks were violating antitrust laws all signed the compliance
document to show that they had read and understood Christie's
antitrust policy-as did Davidge himself-even as he continued to
meet with his Sotheby's counterpart in violation of both American
antitrust law and Christie's own stated policy.300 Similarly, through-
out its participation and often leadership of the electrical equipment
cartels, General Electric had expressly articulated a policy against
price fixing, but its own executives made clear that "the directive
was only for 'public consumption,' and not to be taken seriously."' 0 '
fine."); see also ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 22 ('The existence of an effective
compliance program can once again be significant, since the Guidelines provide for a
downward departure in cases of 'exceptionally low culpability."'); Spratling, The Experience
and Views of the Antitrust Division, supra note 32 ("Although a compliance program will
rarely prevent an organization from being prosecuted if it commits an antitrust violation, a
sound compliance program may serve to reduce an organization's criminal fine range once it
is convicted."). But see ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 21 (noting that the
Sentencing Guidelines "create a rebuttable presumption in some cases that an organization
did not have an effective program in place if high-level personnel, or those with substantial
authority, were involved"); id. at 54 ("[A] well-designed compliance program may, in some
circumstances, help a company qualify for sentence mitigation under the sentencing
guidelines, so long as the employees who committed the violation were not 'high-level
personnel' of the organization. In the Antitrust Division's experience, however, most antitrust
crimes involve senior executives, which would disqualify the company from receiving any
sentence mitigation under the Sentencing Guidelines, no matter how good its corporate
compliance program.").
297. See Spratling, Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse, supra note 288, at
346.
298. See Chavez, supra note 174, at 811.
299. MASON, supra note 1, at 206.
300. See id.
301. Geis, supra note 83, at 145.
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It is hardly surprising that antitrust compliance programs may
fail to stop ongoing price fixing. Although the Sentencing Commis-
sion criteria for compliance programs includes asking whether the
defendant organization had training programs for its employees, the
criteria do not address the most important issue-the content of the
training programs."' Most such programs focus on explaining the
contours of antitrust law, but that is not the primary area on which
compliance programs should focus in connection with price-fixing
cartels. While some areas of antitrust law are complicated and
nuanced, such as when tying arrangements are illegal, the legend-
ary complexity of antitrust law is not an issue in the criminal
price-fixing context. Criminal antitrust law is clear: executives and
mid-level managers engaged in cartel activity know that they are
breaking the law.3 °3
Most importantly, antitrust compliance programs generally do not
include the information that would enlighten employees about the
benefits of betraying a price-fixing employer.30 4 For example, it is
not clear that cartel participants attending such programs receive
a full understanding of the personal penalties that price fixing
entails. Although prison may be mentioned as a possibility, the risk
is generally viewed as remote or merely theoretical; many actual
price fixers would likely be surprised to learn how many people have
served time in federal prison for price fixing. In many (probably
most) instances, employees are not likely to be informed that they
could be held personally liable for the harm caused by a cartel if
they participate in it. Moreover, even when employees are told
302. See ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 29 ("Only 'effective' compliance
programs qualify for amnesty or leniency, however. Law enforcement agencies provide some
minimum requirements for a compliance program to be considered 'effective.'); see also
Spratling, The Experience and Views of the Antitrust Division, supra note 32 (discussing the
Sentencing Commission requirements).
303. See, e.g., supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text; see also ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE,
supra note 30, at 50 ("[Cartel conspirators] were fully aware they were violating the law in
the United States and elsewhere, and their only concern was to avoid detection. Many of the
conspirators openly discussed-and even joked among themselves about-the criminal nature
of their agreements."); Baker & Faulkner, supra note 78, at 844 (describing conspirators'
knowledge of the illegality of their actions).
304. A review of the antitrust compliance policies and materials of several companies
reveals no mention of the government's antitrust leniency programs. See ANTITRUST
COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at pt. II (reprinting compliance manuals from several
corporations).
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about the penalties for price fixing, they are often not informed
about the benefits of confession, including individual amnesty. °5
Firms rationally exclude such material because, in order to receive
credit for having an effective compliance program, the Sentencing
Guidelines do not require the firm to inform its employees of the
benefits of selling out a cartel.0 6 Given that the high-level execu-
tives who run cartels often have some input into what messages are
communicated about antitrust compliance, it is hardly surprising
that a pro-confession theme is not conveyed.0 7 In short, most
antitrust compliance programs do not allow employees to accurately
perform a cost-benefit analysis with respect to confession. This
undermines the ability of any such program to expose or deter price
fixing. 30
8
Finally, some antitrust compliance programs seem specifically
designed to prevent individual employees from being faithless
agents. For example, some advise employees that if government
investigators ever approach them with inquiries about price fixing,
employees should report the inquiry to the firm and inform the
government official that "cooperation has to be coordinated through
counsel. 309 For example, DaimlerChrysler's written antitrust com-
pliance materials instruct its employees that:
[t]o insure that proper procedures are followed by government
investigators, any written or oral inquiry made by any agency,
including the Justice Department, FTC, FBI or state antitrust
enforcement authorities, or any inquiry from an attorney not
representing DaimlerChrysler, should be referred to OGC. You
should politely advise the person making the inquiry that the
matter is being referred to OGC. No information should be
305. See id.
306. See Jaglom, supra note 292, at 1086 (discussing criteria for an "effective compliance
program" (citations omitted)).
307. See ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 50-51 ("Many of the multinational
cartels prosecuted by the Antitrust Division involved executives who had received extensive
antitrust compliance counseling, and who often had significant responsibilities in the firm's
antitrust compliance programs.").
308. See id. at 45-46 ("Only when company employees fully appreciate the risk of detection,
the potential penalties for violations, and the destabilizing effect of the Leniency Program,
will they fully recognize the potential costs of breaking the law.").
309. Jaglom, supra note 292, at 1088.
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disclosed and no documents should be provided without approval
of OGC. Advise OGC of all inquiries immediately. 10
This is typical of the antitrust strategy of firms with written
policies.31'
To remedy the flaws in many antitrust compliance programs,
federal prosecutors and judges should impose additional require-
ments on such programs as a condition to granting any preferential
treatment to firms for conducting such programs. First, employees
should receive all of the accurate facts that would encourage them
to be faithless and report violations. As some programs already do
to some extent, this would include providing information about the
consequences for violating antitrust laws-including ten years
imprisonment, multi-million dollar fines, and personal liability.312
But employees should also be clearly informed of the government's
carve-out policy. Employees should receive data and real-world
examples of the number of price fixers in prison and how many of
them were carved out, sometimes sold up the river by their employ-
ers. The risk of being carved out will not be as effective a deterrent
to price fixing unless individuals are aware of the threat.
In addition, the program should explicitly inform all relevant
employees of the benefits of confessing. This should include an
accurate account of the Individual Leniency Policy.313 The audience
should be told that the people with the best records of the cartel's
activities are the ones who get the best deals from prosecutors,
again providing real-world examples. In conjunction with the
explanation of why individual employees may be better off making
their own early deals with federal prosecutors, employees should be
made aware of the firm's motives to betray its price-fixing employ-
ees, and how firms have done so in the past.
310. ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, Manual 2, at 3.
311. See id. Manual 7 (Tenneco's Antitrust Compliance Policy); id. Manual 8 (Coca-Cola's
Antitrust Policy).
312. See id. at 47.
313. See id. at 48 ("An effective compliance program should also educate company
executives about the key features of the Antitrust Division's Leniency Program. A basic
familiarity with the program can help prevent antitrust violations in the first place by making
sure that company personnel understand the destabilizing effect that the Leniency Program
has on cartels.").
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The purpose of these changes is to convince employees that when
it comes to price fixing, their interests diverge from their employers'
interests. Properly educated about the incentives of other cartel
participants to reveal the conspiracy, individual employees should
develop a healthy distrust for people with knowledge of the price-
fixing conspiracy. Painting a more accurate picture of the costs
and benefits of price fixing for employees should deter them from
participating in a cartel in the first place, which is the ultimate
purpose of antitrust compliance programs.315 Thus, in order to
receive any credit for maintaining antitrust compliance programs,
firms must truly inform individuals of the punishments for partici-
pating in price fixing and the rewards for exposing cartel activity.
Of course, reliance on companies' own internal antitrust compli-
ance programs is by no means a total solution. First, the price
fixer controls the message and can spin it, as General Electric did
with its price-fixing employees.316 Antitrust compliance programs
presented with a knowing wink from senior management are
unlikely to discourage a firm's sales team from participating in
cartel activity. 31 This can be remedied to some extent by having
employees watch approved videos or read approved literature.15
Employees should have to sign a statement, under penalty of
perjury, that they have watched the appropriate video. Although
that may seem extreme, we are trying to deter and expose cartels
that impose billions of dollars of damages on consumers worldwide.
If requiring people to watch a video and swear that they watched it
can help in the effort, this seems like a small price to pay.319
Second, internal antitrust compliance programs cannot reach all
individuals currently engaged in price fixing. Smaller firms do not
generally have antitrust compliance programs, yet they are just as
314. See Katyal, supra note 136, at 1391 ("If conspirators learned that the government has
persistently made use of information provided by co-conspirators, it could alter the impression
that criminals are bonded to each other.").
315. See Chavez, supra note 174, at 857.
316. See Geis, supra note 83, at 144-45; see also supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
317. See Jaglom, supra note 292, at 1081-82.
318. See ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 79-100 (discussing technology-based
antitrust education tools); Jaglom, supra note 292, at 1087 (same).
319. This Section does not suggest making firms do this as a matter of course; rather, those
firms that want to develop a qualifying antitrust compliance program-in order to ease the
penalties for illegal activity-must satisfy these requirements.
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susceptible to the lure of price fixing. Local industries that are often
plagued by price fixing-such as school milk,32 ° local plumbing,
3 21
and the cement trade3 22-do not generally utilize antitrust compli-
ance programs. To communicate with price fixers in such industries,
alternative fora must be exploited.
b. Presentations at Trade Association Meetings
Trade associations have played a critical role in the propagation
of price fixing. Studies have repeatedly confirmed that trade
associations are involved in over one-third of reported cartel
cases.3 2' This is not surprising for several reasons. First, trade
associations provide opportunities for rivals to coordinate instead of
compete.324 Trade associations can facilitate essential coordination
for the cartelization of unconcentrated industries.2 Sometimes the
head office of a trade association will suggest prices and production
quotas, as happened with the industrial alcohol cartel. 26
Second, trade associations often serve as social networks among
potential cartelists. Trade associations can create social norms
favorable to price fixing by "foster[ing] a social climate conducive to
320. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
322. See Press Release, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indianapolis Ready Mixed
Concrete Producer and Three Executives Indicted on Price-Fixing Charge (Apr. 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2006/215589.pdf.
323. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 21, at 61 ("Posner (1970), for example, reports that
44 percent of the cartels in his sample used an industry association to facilitate the price-
fixing agreement. Hay and Kelley (1974) and Arthur G. Fraas and Douglas F. Greer (1977)
both find that trade associations were involved in about a third of the U.S. price-fixing
conspiracies in their samples. Similarly, the vast majority of cartels in Symeonidis's sample
were organized and maintained by trade associations." (citations omitted)); see also Arthur
G. Fraas & Douglas F. Greer, Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis,
26 J. INDUS. ECON. 21, 34 (1977); George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of
Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13, 21 (1974) ("In seven out of eight cases with
more than fifteen firms in the conspiracy, a formal industry trade association was involved.").
324. See Fraas & Greer, supra note 323, at 39 (noting that "a trade association can serve
as a vehicle for the coordination of a price fixing agreement").
325. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 21, at 44 ("There are in fact many successful
cartels in quite unconcentrated industries, but they almost always rely on industry
associations.").
326. SIMON N. WHITNEY, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL CONTROL 132 (1934) ("In
addition, suggestions as to price and production policy were occasionally made from the office
of the Institute.").
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collusion."32 For example, when wool manufacturers engaged in
price fixing during the inter-war period, their trade association
hosted speakers who gave rousing oratories about the evils of price
cutting and the virtues of cooperation."'
Finally, some trade associations are formed explicitly for the
purpose of providing cover for price-fixing schemes." 9 For example,
the recent lysine cartel created a Potemkin trade association,
including fake agendas, so that its illegal meetings could be
represented to the outside world as innocuous trade association
gatherings.33 ° Other trade associations combine both legal and
illegal components in their conferences, using the legal aspects of
the gatherings to conceal the criminal collusion.331 Many illegal
cartels-including those in citric acid,332 electrical equipment,333 and
dairy products334-held legitimate trade association meetings during
the day and illegal meetings after hours.
In sum, while some trade associations came to facilitate illegal
price fixing, some cartelists created trade associations for the
purpose of concealing an illegal conspiracy. Importantly, when trade
associations are employed as cover for cartels, it is harder for mem-
ber firms' own internal antitrust compliance programs to spot price
fixing.335 In any case, the relationship between trade associations
327. Fraas & Greer, supra note 323, at 39.
328. WHITNEY, supra note 326, at 121.
329. CONNOR, supra note 42, at 12 ("Cartels frequently utilized industry trade associations
as covers for their illegal meetings, prepared false agendas and false minutes, and took many
other steps to hide their conspiracies."); see also EICHENWALD, supra note 7, at 3.
330. See EICHENWALD, supra note 7, at 208. Many historic trade associations, such as the
Rubber Institute, were also founded specifically to reduce competition and price cutting.
WHITNEY, supra note 326, at 139 ('To meet the problems of competition and price cutting, the
Rubber Institute was founded on June 1, 1928.").
331. See CONNOR, supra note 42, at 28.
332. Id. at 135-37; EICHENWALD, supra note 7, at 68.
333. FULLER, supra note 142, at 136 n.44; HERLING, supra note 85, at 315.
334. Lanzillotti, supra note 43, at 429 n.44 ("In the Western Kentucky case, according to
testimony by industry witnesses, the bid-rigging arrangements were hatched at meetings of
the Western Kentucky Dairy Products Association, which were usually held in conjunction
with or following meetings of the Kentucky Milk Marketing and Anti-Monopoly
Commission.").
335. CONNOR, supra note 42, at 545 ("However, none of these internal checks and balances
will catch collusive behavior by employees if a cartel uses a legitimate trade association as a
cover for illegal price fixing.').
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and price fixing suggests that any efforts to thwart cartelization
must pay special attention to trade associations.
If trade association meetings are where cartels are born and
nurtured, then the Antitrust Division should develop an educational
program to make presentations at these trade association meetings.
Although most of the content would mimic that provided to most
large firms, people in trade associations "often erroneously believe
that subjects which could not otherwise be discussed by competitors
are somehow permissible if undertaken within a trade association.
They should be disabused of this notion."33 In addition to clarifying
the legality of agreements made through trade associations,
antitrust presentations at trade association events should explain
the benefits of defection from a cartel, as well as one's co-conspira-
tors' temptations to confess.
Given the high number of trade associations, it would be impossi-
ble to provide such educational efforts to all trade associations.
Accordingly, antitrust authorities should focus on those trade
associations that raise the greatest concern: for example, because of
prior price fixing in the industry, a concentrated market, or simply
rumors or other suspicions of collusion. Also, while it would be
practically impossible for antitrust officials to explain the rational-
ity of confession to every worker who might be an agent within a
cartel, an effort focused on trade associations is likely to reach many
individuals who may either be asked to violate antitrust laws or are
actually participating in price fixing.
Although trade associations are sometimes large entities, the
antitrust message only needs to convince one person to bring down
an entire cartel. Again, deterrents and incentives only work if the
target is fully aware of the punishments and rewards for particular
actions. If antitrust enforcers can spread the word about the
benefits of confessing, then there is a greater likelihood that agents
will be faithless, cartels exposed, and deterrence enhanced.
336. ANTiTRUST COMPuANCE, supra note 30, at 138.
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IV. DECOUPLING INTERESTS FROM THE PRINCIPAL'S PERSPECTIVE:
GETTING EMPLOYERS To DISTRUST EMPLOYEES
Agency cost theory suggests that decoupling the interests of price-
fixing firms and their employees may encourage individuals to
expose antitrust conspiracies. This Part argues that once the
interests are decoupled, price-fixing firms themselves may take
actions in their own self-interest that destabilize the cartel. In
particular, the risk of faithless agents may lead cartel member firms
to delegate less, thereby reducing the efficiency of the cartel
operation, or even to confess as a preemptive move. Either action
decreases the expected value of cartelization and makes price fixing
a less attractive opportunity for firms considering whether to
initiate or join a price-fixing conspiracy.
A. The Risk of Faithless Agents Increases Cartel Costs
An antitrust regime that significantly punishes faithful agents
and rewards faithless agents should drive cartel firms to signifi-
cantly reduce the number of individuals actively involved in the
price fixing. Each employee who knows about the cartel is a poten-
tial weak link that the government might persuade to expose the
conspiracy.337 Higher-level executives will worry that an employee
has taken and kept accurate, incriminating notes or other evidence.
To diminish the risk of a faithless agent betraying the cartel, each
firm must further minimize its number of agents.33 This, however,
can weaken the price-fixing conspiracy as cartel managers have to
focus on concealing the conspiracy instead of maximizing its
efficiency.339
337. See Katyal, supra note 136, at 1312 ("The more conspirators, the more witnesses there
are to flip and the more ominous the prisoners' dilemma for a conspirator.").
338. In fact, many cartel firms conceal their price-fixing activity from their own employees.
See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 52, at 251 ("[The prosecutor] focused on taped statements that
the ADM sales force was to be kept in the dark about lysine pricing. 'The salesman could go
off to another company and turn in the top people at ADM and report that there's price-fixing.
So, the salesmen couldn't be trusted."); Garland, supra note 71, at 50 (discussing the graphite
electrodes cartel).
339. See Baker & Faulkner, supra note 78, at 838 ('Using archival data, we reconstruct the
communication networks involved in three major [price-fixing] conspiracies (switchgear,
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Cartels are more stable when the employees of the participating
firms are aware of the price-fixing conspiracy. Additionally, cartels
operate most efficiently when all the member firms' employees are
in on the deal. For example, the electrical equipment cartel was
stable in large part because so many people in the industry knew
the score. Over time, as the cartel's operations grew and ex-
panded-geographically and across product lines-more employees
needed to be brought into the conspiracy in order for the cartel to
function. If too many salespeople were out of the loop, the bid
rigging simply could not occur. More importantly, the unhindered
free flow of information between principals and agents in price-
fixing firms provides the flexibility necessary for cartels to function
efficiently.34 °
Uninformed employees can also undermine cartels by creating the
risk of misunderstandings. For example, salespeople unaware of a
price-fixing agreement may actually engage in competition. The
other members of the cartel may interpret this as cheating on the
cartel agreement, which generally leads to price wars and competi-
tion.341 Furthermore, in order to conceal the collusion, price-fixing
firms may "have to adopt a seemingly competitive behavior so as not
to arouse the suspicions of their employees." '342 Any increased
secrecy within firms can therefore make cartel operations more
costly and confusing. For example, cartel members must take steps
to avoid detection, such as using unsigned communications and
referring to cartel members by code names or numbers.343
Ultimately, the higher cartel costs that result from the need to
involve fewer employees and keep secrets from those who are not
involved increase the likelihood that cartelization will not be cost-
beneficial. Rational firms will not enter a cartel unless they believe
transformers, and turbines). We find that the structure of illegal networks is driven primarily
by the need to maximize concealment, rather than the need to maximize efficiency.").
340. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 21, at 67 ("Hierarchy and communication are
important to cartel success because the world is dynamic and contracts are inherently
incomplete.").
341. See Faulkner et al., supra note 73, at 532-34 (discussing the destabilizing effect of a
single episode of cheating in the electrical equipment cartel).
342. Aubert et al., supra note 123, at 36.
343. See FULLER, supra note 142, at 72 (noting use of coded numbers and unsigned
communications in electrical equipment cartel); Garland, supra note 71, at 50 (discussing use
of code names by graphite electrodes cartel).
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that the cartel will be stable. Because greater secrecy increases the
risks of "accidental competition" and misunderstandings giving rise
to price wars, the specter of faithless agents may lead executives to
conclude that price fixing is not worth the risk.
B. Preemptive Confession by Cartel Firms
Providing incentives to individual employees to expose price
fixing will also affect the firms' incentives to engage in-and
conceal--cartel activity. A confession of price fixing by an individual
employee is not a corporate act and thus does not confer amnesty
upon the employee's firm. Under the Leniency Guidelines, the
company's "confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as
opposed to isolated confessions of individual executives or
officials." '344 Thus, if a lone employee exposes the cartel, the em-
ployee's firm is not entitled to amnesty-only the individual is
guaranteed relief from criminal prosecution. However, if the firm
reaches the government before any individual employee confesses,
then the entire firm is eligible for amnesty. 45 That means that the
firm has a powerful motivation to beat any individual employee to
the punch. By providing sufficient incentives for employees to
expose price-fixing conspiracies, antitrust law can get cartel leaders
to distrust their own agents and to consider confessing themselves.
The risk of faithless agents also increases distrust across firms in
a price-fixing conspiracy. Most cartels require trust in order to
survive. Price fixing represents a prisoner's dilemma: Although the
firms are better off as a group if they cooperate (i.e., fix a higher
price), each individual firm is better off if it cheats (i.e., charges a
price below that fixed by the cartel in order to sell more than its
cartel-alloted output). The solution to the prisoner's dilemma is
mutual trust. The players-in the case of cartels, the firms-need
to be able to trust their cartel partners not to cheat on the cartel
agreement.
The criminalization of price fixing adds another dimension to the
trust quandary; each member of the cartel must trust its co-
conspirators not to expose the criminal conspiracy in exchange for
344. CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 31, at 2.
345. See id. at 1.
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amnesty. The stakes are greater when trusting a cartel partner not
to confess. A betrayal of trust with respect to cheating simply means
a reversion to competition. In contrast, a betrayal of trust in the
form of confessing means criminal liability for the betrayed cartel
members, including the possibility of prison time for executives. All
of the Asian lysine cartel members suffered serious financial
penalties because ADM's employee, Mark Whitacre, exposed their
cartel.346 Davidge's notes clearly showed that Tennant and Taubman
had orchestrated the cartel, and Taubman went to prison based on
the actions of Davidge, a man he never met. 4'
Price-fixing firms may face greater difficulty in addressing the
second species of distrust-concern about exposing the cartel-than
traditional distrust concerns about cheating on the cartel price.
Personal relationships can help create trust with respect to
cheating. An executive at one cartel member firm need not know
and trust every employee at the other firms. So long as she trusts
her counterpart-who has authority to properly implement the
cartel agreement-she does not have to worry about whether
someone else at the other firm wants to cheat.
Providing the proper mix of rewards to faithless agents and
punishments to faithful cartel employees, though, necessarily
changes the cartel's internal trust dynamics. Each individual
participant in the cartel would need to trust not just the other
executives who attend cartel meetings, but all of the knowledgeable
employees of each cartel firm. In order to be fully confident that
one's cartel is stable with respect to confession, one must believe
that the other firms can effectively police their own employees. Any
insecurity could make confession the rational strategy. For example,
if Firm A and Firm B are in a cartel, providing incentives for
employees of Firm A to expose the crime could lead executives in
Firm B to conclude that seeking antitrust amnesty is in Firm B's
best interest, lest one of Firm A's employees confesses first and
renders Firm B ineligible for amnesty.
In short, creating distrust within firms should increase distrust
across firms. Indeed, both of these types of distrust-distrust within
a price-fixing firm and across price-fixing firms-led to the downfall
346. See LIEBER, supra note 52, at 35-36.
347. See MASON, supra note 1, at 322.
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of the auction house conspiracy. The executives within one firm may
fear that a single employee of any cartel firm may inform the
government about the conspiracy in order to secure individual
amnesty. The Christie's case brings this scenario to life. Armed with
his devastating collection of incriminating documents, Christopher
Davidge threatened to make a deal for himself, leaving Christie's
and its executives to face criminal charges on their own.148 Christie's
needed to be concerned not only with Davidge striking a deal to
protect himself at Christie's expense, but also with the possibility
that the executives at Sotheby's could be en route to the prosecutor's
office. Davidge's public departure from Christie's might spur
Sotheby's to confess, lest Davidge expose the price-fixing conspiracy
in exchange for individual leniency.349 Because Christie's would lose
hundreds of millions if either Davidge or Sotheby's confessed first,
Christie's "clearly had only one choice: to hand the documents over
immediately."35 Thus, policies that create distrust within price-
fixing firms have the potential to destabilize entire cartels, as each
conspirator must worry about whether any individual with knowl-
edge of the conspiracy will succumb to the pressure to confess.
V. THE POTENTIAL DOWNSIDES OF CREATING DISTRUST WITHIN
FIRMS
Of course, antitrust policies designed to create cartel-destabilizing
distrust within price-fixing firms could produce other problems.
These include corporate inefficiency caused by distrusting workers
and the risk of false accusations of price fixing. This Part explains
why neither of these potential problems is particularly vexing.
348. See BOIES, supra note 122, at 326.
349. See MASON, supra note 1, at 246.
350. Id.
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A. Distrust and Inefficiency
Trust within firms can facilitate efficient business operations.351
People within a single firm need to trust each other on a daily basis
to ensure that operations run efficiently. In contrast, distrust within
firms can lead to inefficiency. Antitrust authorities would not want
to create a level of distrust that would prevent employees from
working with each other, that would prevent executives from
appropriately delegating work, or that would cause lower-level
employees to behave inefficiently. Parts III and IV advocate
increasing agency costs in part because the distrust between cartel
principals and agents could destabilize a price-fixing conspiracy.
This raises the problem that injecting distrust into business
relationships could undermine the firm from achieving its legitimate
goals.
While this Article advocates creating and harnessing distrust
within price-fixing firms as a means of exposing cartels, this is not
the type of distrust that would improperly interfere with a firm's
legal business conduct. First, it would be overly simplistic to
characterize the modern business entity as either blessed by trust
or plagued by distrust. Trust is not binary, where firms either have
it or do not. Within any given firm, there are different forms and
levels of trust. An employee may trust a co-worker to help with one
particular project but not another task. An employee may confide a
personal secret to a co-worker, but not confess that she is embez-
zling; the employee may trust her co-worker to conceal the secret
but not the embezzlement. People constantly make judgment calls
about what information to trust with friends, family, and business
associates.
Second, any inefficient distrust would be limited to price-fixing
firms. If a firm is not engaging in price fixing, then the executives
have no reason to distrust their employees about exposing an illegal
conspiracy. Moreover, there is no need to inefficiently hide informa-
tion from employees if the firm is doing nothing wrong. In short, any
distrust about exposing a cartel-and the inefficiency associated
351. See Katyal, supra note 136, at 1346 ("Perhaps the most important asset of a firm is
its trust between members. Trust is the glue that allows diverse individuals to work together
easily."); Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 24, at 532-35 (discussing the
importance of trust and cooperation in the business setting).
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with such distrust-would be visited upon firms committing
felonies, not honest businesses.
Third, if the distrust associated with increased agency costs
creates inefficiency within cartel member firms, this would repre-
sent an additional deterrent to price fixing. Firms in cartels may
need to conceal their conduct from their own employees in order to
minimize the risk that one of those employees will expose the
antitrust crimes to federal prosecutors.352 This could reduce the free
flow of information within a price-fixing firm in a way that dimin-
ishes efficiency. However, this inefficiency would simply constitute
an additional cost of belonging to a cartel. 53
A related efficiency problem is that rewarding confessions
through antitrust bounties may improperly empower individuals
who are aware of cartel activity. For example, it would be difficult
for a price-fixing firm to terminate an employee who could threaten
to expose the cartel in retaliation.354 Again, Davidge's departure
strategy is instructive. Price-fixing firms may be compelled to
retain inefficient, lazy, or even corrupt employees who have inside
information about the cartel.355 For example, evidence suggests that
some within ADM knew that Mark Whitacre was embezzling
millions of dollars, yet ADM could ill afford to fire him, lest he
expose ADM's antitrust crimes. 56 It is clearly inefficient for a firm
to retain an employee whose skill set is outmoded or who is looting
the company, but in the cartel context this form of inefficiency is
beneficial; it is essentially a tax on cartel conduct, which should
make price fixing marginally less attractive.3 57 This could enhance
deterrence of price fixing in the long run.35
352. See supra Part IV.A.
353. Also, a firm that engages in price fixing may find it more difficult to attract the best
employees since job candidates may be wary of joining a firm where there is a risk of its
employees getting sent to prison for price-fixing violations. Again, this effect would represent
a tax on cartelization, which is an efficient effect of the proposed changes in antitrust policy.
354. See Buccirossi & Spagnolo, supra note 71, at 19.
355. See Aubert et al., supra note 123, at 22 ("Collusive firms thus have an incentive to
lengthen the tenure of their 'informed' employees and may have a less flexible employment
structure, with employees remaining in office for longer periods than in competitive
companies.").
356. LIEBER, supra note 52, at 50-51.
357. See Aubert et al., supra note 123, at 15-16.
358. See id. at 24.
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B. False Accusations of Price Fixing
Rewarding employees for exposing cartel arrangements creates
a risk that a vengeful employee might make a false accusation or
even attempt to frame his boss, especially if the employee has
been fired. The risk of false accusations nonetheless seems exagger-
ated. First, in order for a prosecution to go forward, the employee
would have to commit perjury, subjecting himself to criminal
prosecution."' Second, false accusations of price fixing could be
easily deterred by imposing meaningful sanctions for lying to
antitrust investigators. 60 Third, no prosecution would ever proceed
based solely on the uncorroborated accusations of an individual.
When insiders report price fixing, federal authorities generally arm
the informant with recording equipment in order to secure proof
positive of the conspiracy." 1 Finally, although other government
programs provide significant bounties for informants, there is no
indication of any serious problem from false accusations or the
fabrication of evidence.36 2
The severe punishment of firms in cartels, coupled with rewards
for exposing price fixing, could theoretically encourage a firm in a
competitive market to falsely "admit" participation in a cartel,
whereby the accusing firm would simultaneously attack its competi-
tors while securing (unneeded) amnesty from criminal prosecution.
Certainly such a move would create a hassle for the falsely charged
competitor. But this strategy seems unlikely because the accusing
firm would open itself up to private liability. Additionally, the same
factors that diminish the risk of false accusations by employees
apply here as well. For example, fraudulent accusations could be
359. See Investigation Profile, supra note 125, at 5 ("Witnesses before the grand jury are
questioned under oath, and witnesses who testify falsely are subject to prosecution for
perjury.").
360. See Buccirossi & Spagnolo, supra note 71, at 20.
361. Investigation Profile, supra note 125, at 5 ("If we have a cooperating insider, we likely
will ask them to use a hidden recorder to tape conversations with cartel members. In
appropriate situations, we may also ask the FBI or other investigating agency to videotape
meetings of the members."); see also supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (describing
use of recording equipment in the lysine cartel).
362. See Buccirossi & Spagnolo, supra note 71, at 20.
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punished severely."'3 Again, there is no evidence of firms making
such false accusations under the current amnesty program.
36
CONCLUSION
Whenever a principal asks an agent to engage in socially
undesirable conduct, the law should encourage the agent's disloy-
alty. Antitrust law should attempt to fashion faithless agents by
decoupling the interests of price-fixing principals and their employ-
ees. This requires punishing the faithful, rewarding the faithless,
and making sure that all price-fixing agents understand the
relevant costs of cartel participation and the benefits of making an
early deal with prosecutors.
By punishing the faithful and rewarding the faithless, antitrust
enforcers should work to make confession cost-beneficial for the
cartel's agents. Individual employees are much more likely than
firms to find that price fixing is not cost-beneficial. Price fixing may
be rational at the firm level so long as the anticipated cartel profits
exceed the damages from exposure discounted by the probability of
getting caught, convicted, and held liable.3 65 At the employee level,
however, it is not a simple matter of dollars and cents. Individual
employees bear a risk that corporations do not: individuals can be
imprisoned. Each employee must consider the risk of imprisonment
and its consequences, including the attendant risks of being ren-
dered permanently unemployable. Once those individual employees
consider the probability of their own imprisonment, engaging in
price fixing may become too risky for the employee even if such
cartelization is cost-beneficial from the firm's perspective.
363. See Aubert et al., supra note 123, at 35.
364. See Buccirossi & Spagnolo, supra note 71, at 20. Firms prosecuted for price fixing
following accusations by amnesty applicants consistently plead guilty to criminal price fixing.
This is not surprising given the amount of evidence that the Antitrust Division secures before
initiating prosecutions.
365. At the firm level, price fixing remains cost-beneficial even when firms are caught and
punished. Financial penalties are not enough with respect to firms. Although members of the
vitamin cartel paid larger fines than any cartel in history, much scholarship demonstrates
that the member firms still profited from their illegal activity. See Lande, supra note 48, at
341 n.48. If firms believe that price fixing is profitable even when caught, they are much more
likely to join cartels despite antitrust laws.
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In short, antitrust policy should better recognize that cartels are
composed of agency relationships and, thus, agency theory should
inform antitrust enforcement efforts. Most importantly, decoupling
the interests of principals and agents provides a cost-effective
mechanism to destabilize price-fixing conspiracies.
